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5Executive Summary
In most countries natural resources are owned by the 
state, although the right to exploit the natural resource 
is typically granted to private companies – sometimes 
in partnership with a state mining company. Compa-
nies can be granted mineral rights in different ways. 
Countries with a well-developed legal system typically 
grant licenses through a legal framework that fully 
governs the rights and obligations of the state and the 
private entity. In such a licensing system, there is very 
little, if any room, for negotiation of key provisions. 
On the other end of the spectrum, however, and par-
ticularly in countries with a weak or inadequate legal 
framework, countries may grant mineral rights to 
companies through individually negotiated agreements 
that contain most, if not all the rights and obligations 
of the parties. In such cases, there is a wide variation of 
key contract provisions and countries regularly end up 
with poorly negotiated deals that confer limited bene-
fits to the country and the communities affected by the 
mining investment and may even sit completely outside 
of the legal framework of the country. For this reason, 
which is more fully set out in this study, countries in-
creasingly favor licensing regimes that limit the types 
of and extent to which terms can be negotiated. 
This study examines the different types of legal regimes 
governing mining projects in 18 countries around the 
world with a particular emphasis on the key provisions 
in mining contracts as well as in law where countries 
have adopted a licensing regime. In so doing, it dis-
cusses some of the reasons for which some countries 
have adopted a licensing regime to fully or partially 
regulate the rights and obligations of the parties in a 
mining project, whereas other countries have opted to 
use mining contracts to do so. Where a country relies 
on contracts to govern some or all aspects of a mining 
project, the study further examines the relationship be-
tween a country’s mining contracts and its legal frame-
work, taking into account the trend – towards more 
legislated terms – that minerals regimes are taking. In 
addition, it analyzes the mining contract negotiation 
and implementation process and attempts to iden-
tify potential opportunities to support resource-rich, 
low-income countries in managing their mining invest-
ments from the planning and preparation for a contract 
negotiation or licensing round to the implementation 
and monitoring of the mining investment.
To answer these questions, the Columbia Center on 
Sustainable Investment (CCSI) compared the provisions 
of 30 mining contracts from 13 countries, analyzed a 
selection of legislative texts related to mining from 18 
countries, and surveyed the experiences of negotiating 
mining contracts through 44 interviews with 39 ex-
perts, government officials, company representatives, 
and civil society organization (CSO) members.
FINDINGS
The comparative analysis of mining contracts, legal 
frameworks governing mining investments and the 
interviews illustrated clear issues and trends related to 
mining contract negotiations and suggested several po-
tential opportunities for support. 
Negotiated mining contracts, while capable of compen-
sating for inadequate or underdeveloped legal regimes, 
far too frequently fail to achieve optimal results for a 
country. The benefits negotiated agreements provide 
in developing countries can also create the issues that 
frequently undermine their success. A lack of trans-
parency, or accountability, the risks of corruption, and 
inconsistent terms creating difficulties in the imple-
mentation and monitoring of mining investments were 
all mentioned as concerns during the interviews. 
The contract negotiation process itself was also cred-
ited with creating additional concerns. In particular, 
inexperience, asymmetrical information, external in-
fluences, and capacity limitations all contribute to sub-
optimal agreements for governments. The assistance of 
external advisors can help alleviate some of these issues 
but can also introduce its own. Poor coordination by 
donors, duplicated efforts and a disproportionate focus 
on negotiations at the expense of assisting in the entire 
negotiation process have hindered the effectiveness of 
these advisors. 
These issues have contributed to the global trend away 
from negotiated mining contracts towards legislated 
terms to govern the rights and obligations of the parties 
in a mining project. There has also been an increas-
ing use of interim mechanisms such as model mining 
agreements to limit the extent to which terms can be 
negotiated. These are positive trends and this report 
makes several recommendations on how to support 
these developments. 
6RECOMMENDATIONS
— Support the development of strong legal frame-
works for mining and supporting model mining 
agreements as an interim measure.
— Support the negotiation of ancillary agreements, 
including those that govern the development of in-
frastructure for a mining project, the local content 
plans and community development agreements. 
— Promote contract transparency.
— Better coordinate donor assistance.
— Provide support both before and after a contract 
negotiation.
— Provide non-legal support to the negotiation and 
implementation process.
— Support regional legal harmonization efforts.
— Build government capacity and understanding of 
commodity markets.
7Introduction
Almost every country in the world has developed a 
distinct mining code, and the ones who have not, like 
Azerbaijan, have developed a body of law to govern the 
application, exploration, exploitation, and reclamation of 
their mineral resources. The granting of mineral rights is 
the point of entry for companies into a country’s mining 
sector. A mineral right gives a company the exclusive 
ability to undertake mining-related activities within a 
designated area. The two primary regimes for granting 
and administrating mineral rights are contracts and li-
censing. 1
In contracts regimes, mineral licenses and the accompa-
nying rights and obligations are negotiated for specific 
projects with each individual company. Contracts re-
gimes are more prevalent in developing countries that 
have young or nascent mining sectors and are supported 
by less robust or reliable legal frameworks.2 The con-
tracts system fills the gaps created by a country’s inade-
quate or underdeveloped mining laws and offers greater 
flexibility for dealing with the unique needs and issues of 
different mining projects. For countries eager for the an-
ticipated economic benefits of mining projects, contracts 
are a much quicker way to move forward than the time- 
and capacity-heavy process of building a strong legal 
framework. Negotiated contracts also result in a body 
of agreements with different terms, putting additional 
monitoring and implementation burdens on already 
weak administrative institutions.
Pure or strict licensing regimes define the process of 
granting mineral licenses and all the accompanying 
rights and obligations in generally applicable laws. In this 
system, the fiscal provisions and environmental regu-
lations are largely identical for all companies. Licensing 
regimes typically exist in countries with strong institu-
tions and a developed mineral sector. Longstanding legal 
frameworks and transparent governance create a safer 
investment environment.3 Public participation through 
the legislative process in democratic states provides a 
venue for incorporating the public’s concerns for the 
sector and decreases the likelihood of political volatility.4 
1 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” 
 (Creative Commons, 2013), p. 12.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Lisa Sachs, Perrine Toledano, Jacky Mandelbaum, with James 
Otto, “Impacts of Fiscal Reforms on Country Attractiveness: 
Learning from the Facts,” in Karl Sauvant, ed., Yearbook on Inter-
national Investment Law & Policy 2011-2012 (Oxford University 
Press, 2012), p. 367.
Because the laws apply equally, the system is easier to 
administer and limits the opportunities for corruption 
in the process by allowing for stronger checks and bal-
ances.5 
Historically, there has been a strong regional trend of 
contracts regimes for the mining sector in Africa. In this 
study alone, which was limited to countries that make at 
least some mining contracts publicly available, Burkina 
Faso, Cameroon, DRC, Guinea, Liberia, Mozambique, and 
Sierra Leone have all negotiated mining agreements in 
recent years. A number of Asian countries with young 
mining sectors also negotiate contracts, including Af-
ghanistan, Azerbaijan and Mongolia.
The reliance on negotiated contracts occurs less fre-
quently in Latin America where licensing regimes are 
more common, and there is often a long history of 
mining. Chile attributes its successful minerals-based 
development to a mining industry that dates back to the 
1700s, a strong legal framework and its non-discretion-
ary mineral rights regimes.6 Like Chile, Peru too has a 
well-defined and unambiguous legal regime for its min-
eral sector.7 Ecuador, on the other hand, with its nascent 
mining industry negotiated a contract in 2012 for its first 
large-scale mining project.8
 
As legal frameworks and government capacity continue 
to develop, the general trend worldwide is towards less 
discretion in the granting of mineral rights.9 Most de-
veloped mining countries, including study countries 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, and Chile, already use licensing 
regimes and in recent years, many developing countries 
have begun reviews and reforms of the legal frame-
works governing their mineral sectors.10 In 2008, Zambia 
5 Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining 
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes: A Review of Issues and 
Challenges in their Design and Application, The Challenge of 
Mineral Wealth: Using Resource Endowments to Foster Sustaina-
ble Development,” (February 2009), p. 9.
6 KPMG Global Mining Institute, “Chile: Country Mining Guide,” 
(2014). 
7 EY Peru, “Peru’s mining and metals investment guide 2014/2015,” 
(2014). 
8 That contract, the Ecuacorriente S.A. Agreement, was reviewed as 
part of this study.
9 ”International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 11 March 2015.
10 The United States is unique among mining countries as mineral 
rights belong to the surface rights holder not the state. “Mineral 
Rights Ownership – What is it and why is it so unique in the 
USA?” International Energy Network, available at  
http://www.ieneurope.com/pdf/Mineral.pdf (last visited 29 April 
2015).
8 replaced its previous mining law with a new Mines and 
Minerals Development Act which expressly prohibits the 
government from entering into any special agreements 
for large-scale mining licenses and which annulled any 
existing development agreements.11 In 2012, Liberia 
began examining a switch from its contracts regime to a 
licensing regime.12 In 2013, Guinea amended its Mining 
Code to remove the ability to negotiate tax provisions 
in mining contracts and the new code will be generally 
applicable to all new mineral rights going forward.13 The 
DRC now technically grants mineral rights through a 
licensing regime, though a lack of retroactive application 
to previously existing rights means that negotiations still 
occur.14
 The transition from a contracts regime to a licensing re-
gime can be slow and difficult. A popular trend in coun-
tries going through that process is the adoption of model 
mining agreements that establish a general structure 
for the agreement and provide most of its non-negotia-
ble provisions, and clearly define the limited areas that 
are negotiable. Burkina Faso, DRC, Guinea, Mongolia, 
Mozambique and Sierra Leone are all either developing 
model agreements or have recently developed model 
agreements. 
11 Mines and Minerals Development Act, Zambia, Arts. 159-160 
(2008).
12 Yann Alix, “The Liberian mining law reform and the impact of 
the Ebola crisis,” Herbert Smith Freehills, (October 2014).
13 Mining Code, Guinea, Arts. 159, 161, 163 (2013).
14 “Civil Society Member,” Telephone interview. 18 March 2015.
This report sets out to examine these trends. It first pro-
vides an overview of licensing regimes and the rationale 
driving their use. It goes on to examine contract regimes 
and the different types of investor-state contracts that 
can be used in a mining investment. The report then 
discusses why contracts have historically been used in 
some jurisdictions and not others, and the circumstances 
that might justify their continued use to regulate mining 
investments. A review of key mining provisions is then 
provided, with an analysis of how such terms are ap-
proached in the different regimes and how the different 
types of agreements in contract regimes address these 
provisions. Finally, the report analyzes the experiences 
of different parties involved in the planning, preparation, 
negotiation, implementation, and monitoring of mining 
contracts, with an assessment of the challenges faced 
in the process and an identification of best practices. 
The report ultimately seeks to provide a view of the best 
potential approaches for German Development Coop-
eration to support developing countries in granting and 
administering their mineral rights.
9Methodology
In preparing this report CCSI developed a matrix to 
compare key contract terms. Additionally, we reviewed 
at least two mining-related legislative texts in each 
country. A literature review and additional open-source 
research complemented this process. The team selected 
the subject countries, contracts, and legislative texts in 
consultation with BGR. 
To ensure that the study provides a representative over-
view of the legal regimes governing mining globally, care 
was taken to select countries representing the widest pos-
sible spectrum of experiences. The criteria used for the 
selection of sample countries15 and contracts included:
— Regulatory regime: We selected countries repre-
senting a range of legal and regulatory systems 
generally, as well as in relation to mining-related 
contracts specifically. We included countries with 
both common law and civil lawsystems. In addi-
tion, we selected countries where (i) mineral rights 
are governed solely through a licensing regime 
under the existing legal framework, and (ii) mineral 
rights are governed under a contract regime that 
allows for agreements to supplement or supplant 
the existing legal framework.16
— Contract type: Different contract types were ana-
lyzed, including mining development agreements, 
concessions, investment promotion agreements, 
service agreements,17 joint venture agreements, and 
production-sharing contracts.
— Income level of the country: Countries with dif-
ferent income levels and stages of development 
were chosen to show the impact of these factors 
on the contract negotiation process, particularly in 
relation to the fiscal and stabilization provisions.
15 The criteria fulfilled by each country selected for the study is 
detailed further in Appendix A.
16 Lisa Sachs, Perrine Toledano, Jacky Mandelbaum, with James 
Otto, "Regulatory and Policy Developments Regarding FDI in 
Extractive Industries,"- Karl P. Sauvant, Yearbook on Int’l Invest-
ment Law and Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, January 
2013).
17 While no service agreements are reviewed as part of this study, 
they are discussed in the context of the Philippines which uses 
a form of service agreement called Financial or Technical Assis-
tance Agreements (FTAA).
— Country’s experience with the mineral sector: 
Some countries have only recently become at-
tractive to mining investors as a result of rising 
commodities prices over the past decade, whereas 
others have a longer, more established mining 
history and sector. Such differences in experience 
with mining can also impact the use, style, and 
content of contracts.
— Era during which the contract was signed: The 
content of contracts has gone through several 
phases over the past century, shifting from being 
development-oriented in the 1970s to being in-
vestment friendly in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
shifting yet again toward strengthened provisions 
for the host countries at the height of the com-
modities boom in the 2000s.
After identifying the sample of countries and con-
tracts, CCSI formulated a list of experts to interview 
and drafted a comprehensive list of guiding interview 
questions in conjunction with BGR. CCSI conducted 44 







STUDY COUNTRIES WITH REVIEWED CONTRACTS:
Afghanistan DRC Mongolia 
Azerbaijan Ecuador Mozambique 
Burkina Faso Guinea Philippines 
Cameroon Liberia Sierra Leone
* Peru grants mineral rights through a licensing regime; 
however, the country allows for investment promotion 
agreements which can exist outside the mining sector but 
can apply to mining projects. Several of those agreements 
were reviewed for this study. A fuller explanation of the role 
of investment promotion agreements in strict licensing re-
gimes is provided later in this report.
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interviews to supplement its analysis of each country’s 
legal regime and associated mining contracts. For al-
most every country in its sample, CCSI interviewed two 
experts who have been involved in advising on the legal 
framework, or in the contract negotiations of some of 
the mining concessions with respect to that country.
The 39 interviewees included 13 external advisors,  
11 government officials, 9 corporate representatives or 
corporate legal counsel and 6 CSO representatives.18 In 
general, most interviewees were closely involved with 
mineral contract negotiations and/or the drafting or 
review of at least one of the two pieces of legislation 
being reviewed. CCSI’s comparative review and analysis 
of legislation and contracts in the study countries were 
used to inform the interviews. The insights gathered 
from those interviews were in turn used to give depth 
to CCSI’s analysis and influence the direction of further 
research. CCSI later supplemented this work with a 
second round of targeted interviews. These seven addi-
tional interviews included both those previously inter-
viewed and two new experts and were done to resolve 
outstanding questions and fill in any gaps revealed dur-
ing later analysis.
18 Several of those interviewed have worked for both governments 
and corporations in negotiations. For the purposes of this study 
if the focus of the interview was their work assisting govern-
ments they are considered external advisors and if the focus was 






“Many countries with successful minerals-based 
development attribute it to their non-discretionary 
regimes. Chile, for example, would faint if you men-
tion negotiation,” International Advisor. 
In a regulatory regime that is purely licensing-based, 
companies apply for mining licenses that are governed 
by generally applicable law. All major obligations re-
lating to the project, including taxes, royalties, envi-
ronmental protections and local content requirements 
are clearly established in legislation and regulations.19 
Whatever the process of allocating mineral rights, 
all experts concur in appreciating the net benefits of 
licensing regimes (with benefits outweighing the costs). 
For one, there are much fewer opportunities for cor-
ruption when a generally applicable law sets out the 
same requirements, obligations, and benefits for every 
company, than there are when negotiating directly be-
tween governments and companies. 
Second, it reduces the damage that can be inflicted in 
negotiations by information asymmetries and govern-
ment inexperience. 
Third, there is less of a burden on government admin-
istration because generally applicable laws are signif-
icantly less labor intensive to implement and monitor 
than a series of different individual agreements with 
varying terms.20 
Fourth, publication of both applications and decisions 
allows for public sector oversight as well.21 
Fifth, a licensing regime typically places exclusive 
responsibility for granting mineral rights in one reg-
ulatory or administrative body backed by law which 
limits government discretion in awarding, suspending 
or cancelling those rights offering companies greater 
security of tenure.22 This contributes to a mining sec-
19 "Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,"  
(Creative Commons, 2013), p. 14.
20 Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining 
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 9.
21 Ibid.
22 World Bank Group, “Sector Licensing Studies: Mining Sector,” 
(January 2009); San Bilal, “Regulatory Reform in the Liberian 
Mining Sector: Striking the Right Balance,” GREAT Insights (July/
August 2014); “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 17 
March 2015.
tor that is seen as attractive and safe for major invest-
ment by foreign companies. 
THE CHALLENGES OF LICENSING 
 REGIMES
While all experts agree that the benefits of licensing 
regimes outweigh the costs, such regimes are not free 
from challenges, including some they share with con-
tract regimes.
Difficulties of Legislative Development: Developing 
the strong legal framework necessary for a licensing 
regime can be a lengthy and difficult process for devel-
oping countries. Drafting, enacting and/or amending 
all the legislation and regulation needed can require 
the kind of significant expenditures of attention, 
capacity and political capital that is difficult for a gov-
ernment dealing with many other issues to provide.23 
The process can be interrupted or set back by political 
instability or changes in regime. Changing a single law 
can be a process that takes years. This is a challenge 
that decreases as a country and its legal framework 
develops.24 
23 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 29 April 2015.
24 “International Advisor 1.” Telephone interview. 28 April 2015.
EXPLORATION/EXPLOITATION LICENSE
A license (or tenement, permits or authority to mine de-
pending on the country) is a form of “permit” in which 
the government grants to a company certain exclusive 
rights to mineral resources in exchange for compen-
sation. Licenses convey the right to explore for and/or 
exploit specific minerals and the authority to carry out 
commercial operations, whether the regulatory regime 
is law-based or contract-based. The exploitation license 
can be awarded in several ways. They are frequently 
issued in the same license granting exploration rights 
with the exploration license providing for the right to 
an exploitation license. There can however be a period 
where the company has the exclusive right to apply for 
an exploitation license.
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Less flexibility: The general framework in licensing 
regimes is to be much more prescribed.25 Removing 
that flexibility and making the country less attrac-
tive to investors is a concern for some governments 
when considering a licensing system. This is a concern 
generally seen in developing countries with a shorter 
proven history of successful mining projects.26 Min-
ing companies are quick to point out that all mining 
projects are different. While there are serious issues 
with a system where everything is open to negoti-
ation, from a corporate perspective it offers greater 
opportunity to tailor an agreement to fit specific needs 
and opportunities and maximize the viability of that 
individual project. One advisor observed that a negoti-
ated agreement could allow for more specific periodic 
review clauses establishing events that trigger review 
or renegotiation.27 Agreements could establish which 
provisions could be adjusted, to what extent, and under 
what circumstances in much greater detail than would 
be capable in the law.
Legislative inaction: Changing licensing procedures 
set out in laws and regulations requires changing those 
laws and regulations. For almost all governments this 
is a slow process. This has caused problems in some 
countries where a moratorium is put on the approv-
al of new licenses in anticipation of a new law being 
enacted. In 2014, Mongolia repealed the 2012 Law on 
Prohibition of Granting Exploration Licenses, which 
was just the last in a series of moratoriums issued 
by the government as it worked to develop its new 
minerals law.28 The possibility of a legislative change 
in Brazil has resulted in an unofficial moratorium on 
issuing mining licenses in that country since 2011. 
Some corporate representatives expressed concern 
about the impact that not having new exploration for 
several years will have on the mining sector in the 
future. They have also predicted further delays after 
a law is passed while the new system is implemented 
and the necessary capacity is developed, especially if 
the system changes to auctions, which are more labor 
intensive to administer.29 The ad hoc nature of contract 
negotiations, while raising issues of its own, can avoid 
these problems.
25 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 11 March 2015.
26 “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 17 March 2015.
27 “International Advisor 1.” Telephone interview. 22 April 2015.
28 Chris Melville, “Note on the Amendment to the Law of Mongolia 
on Minerals dates 1 July 2014,” Hogan Lovells (26 August 2014).
29 “Company Executive.” Telephone interview. 10 March 2015
Tension between legal regimes: While one of the 
benefits of a licensing regime is intended to be easier 
administration through use of consistent terms, these 
laws are generally not retroactive which can compli-
cate the transition to a licensing regime. The DRC is a 
good example. The granting of mineral rights there is 
now regulated by the Mining Code, which prescribes 
a mandatory procedure for the granting of a mineral 
license. Applicants are generally not able to negotiate 
the terms under which a license is granted. Companies 
cannot contract out of any obligations of the Mining 
Code. However, if a mineral right was obtained prior 
to the commencement of the current Mining Code, 
the law allows for such rights to be alienated under 
terms negotiated by the parties. The majority of such 
rights were originally held by state-owned companies, 
which means that the DRC state does find itself ne-
gotiating the terms of transfer of mining agreements 
–  potentially in ways that conflict with the terms of 
the Mining Code – to private parties, or to public- 
private joint ventures. This loophole does not extend 
to all contractual terms. For instance, the agreement 
cannot derogate from the Tax Code. Nonetheless, the 
ability to negotiate out of existing laws in this narrow 
circumstance undermines the intentions of a licens-
ing regime and complicates its administration. Addi-
tionally, companies which entered into contracts for 
mineral rights prior to the introduction of the Mining 
Code and its associated licensing system in 2002 had 
the option of continuing to operate under the previous 
regime, which allowed for the negotiation of contrac-
tual terms.30 
Despite the licensing provisions of the Mining Code, 
the DRC has also since signed a number of resources- 
for-infrastructure agreements. These agreements, ar-
ranged directly between the government and primarily 
Chinese or Korean investors, simply exchanged min-
erals for large infrastructural development projects.31 
The legality of these agreements was an open question 
until 2014 when the DRC legalized these arrangements 
as public private partnership (PPP) conventions. This 
new PPP law carved out a special legal environment 
and tax regimes for these projects.32 
30 “Civil Society Representative.” Telephone interview. 18 March 
2015.
31 Global Witness, “China and Congo: Friends in Need,” (March 2011).
32 Upio Kakura Wapol, “A New Legal Framework to Promote the 
Public-Private Partnership in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo,” Cabemery (29 April 2014).
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Licensing Regime Contract Regime
Key Features  — Terms governed by generally applicable law
— Frequently used in developed countries or 
those with established mining sectors
— Terms primarily established in individually 
negotiated agreements
— Frequently used in developing countries or 
those with young mining sectors
Benefits  — Less opportunity for corruption
— Reduced information asymmetries
— Easier to implement
— Public oversight
— Security of tenure
— Flexibility and specificity
— Supplements gaps in inadequate legal frame-
works
— Signals government commitment
Challenges  — Difficulties of legislative development
— Less flexibility
— Legislative inaction
— Often poorly negotiated
— Discretion
— Varying contract terms can complicate 
 implementation
— Undermining confidence in rule of law
— Confidentiality





the government’s discretion in awarding, suspending 
and cancelling a company’s mineral rights.38
However, governments – generally in developing coun-
tries with young mining sectors – are still negotiating 
contracts with companies, and a number still heavily 
rely on them to establish a company’s rights and obli-
gations for a specific project. There are several reasons 
why contracts are still in use. First, countries generally 
do so because they are just beginning to develop their 
mineral sectors and have existing legal regimes that 
are inadequate or insufficiently developed to regu-
late mining projects without the help of negotiated 
contracts. Some have argued that this illustrates their 
value in establishing a stable framework for a project 
and overcoming market deficiencies.39 Other interna-
tional advisors argue that the heightening expectations 
for the benefits mining projects will create will always 
make agreements necessary to supplement legislation, 
which is inherently slow to adapt to adequately address 
new issues.40 
Similarly, negotiation can be useful in situations where 
even with well-developed laws and regulations a 
country needs the flexibility to accommodate a special 
mining project.41 This could occur in the context of 
greenfields – unexplored territory where it is unknown 
if minerals exist – or new types of mining where gov-
ernments have an interest in encouraging investment 
but don’t want those incentives to be permanent.42 
This is also seen with exceptionally large or unusu-
al projects that require special tax provisions to be 
commercially viable.43 This situation, which was most 
frequently invoked during interviews in regards to 
Australia, is discussed further below.44
38 Bilal, 2014, op. cit; “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 17 
March 2015.
39 Richard Hillman, “The Future Role for State Agreements in West-
ern Australia,” Australian Resources and Energy Law Journal 293 
(2006), p. 301.
40 Sustainable Development Strategies Group, “Model Mining 
Development Agreement – Transparency Template,” (May 2012).
41 Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining 
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 33
42 “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 21 April 2015.
43 Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining 
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 33.
44 “Corporate Lawyer.” Telephone interview. 4 March 2015; “Corpo-
rate Lawyer.” Telephone interview. 13 March 2015.
Almost all countries in the world have a mining law – 
Azerbaijan being a notable exception – that they use 
to regulate their mining sector, but only some of them 
– including the 13 countries which have contracts 
reviewed in this study – allow for the possibility of 
negotiated state agreements creating special regula-
tory systems for mining projects.33 Contracts secure a 
company’s right to explore and/or exploit mineral re-
sources in exchange for the agreed upon compensation 
to the government. The difference between the licenses/
concessions in a pure licensing regime and contracts 
in a pure contractual regime is that in the latter the 
contract is the primary document establishing the 
terms and governing the project. Such contracts cover 
the same issue areas as those in a licensing regime, but 
the depth, detail and specificity with which they do so 
depends on the level of development and comprehen-
siveness of the country’s legal regime. 
Unlike in a pure licensing regime, negotiated contracts 
can supplement or even supplant existing laws.34 In 
many cases these contracts are then ratified by the 
legislature making them essentially laws unto them-
selves.35 
Purely contractual regimes are less common now, and 
the overwhelming trend has been to regulate mining 
through clear, strong legislation and regulation and 
to rely on mining and tax codes, environmental laws, 
health and safety regulations, and other generally 
applicable laws rather than negotiating different terms 
for different parties.36 Liberia, for example, is in the 
process of updating its mineral law, in part to switch 
from its current contract-based regime to a licensing 
regime. This is an objective for the government be-
cause it expects the new regime to reduce the carve-
outs from the law currently being made through the 
use of negotiated agreements.37 In addition to that gov-
ernment benefit, in interviews government officials ex-
pressed the belief that a licensing regime will provide 
greater security of tenure for companies by limiting 
33 Sachs, Toledano, Mandelbaum, with Otto, "Regulatory and Policy 
Developments Regarding FDI,” 2013, op. cit. 
34 The Study Country Selection Criteria matrix in Appendix A 
identifies which countries have contracts that supplement the 
law and those with contracts that supplant the law.
35 Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining 
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 33.
36 Sustainable Development Strategies Group, “Model Mining 
Development Agreement – Transparency Template,” (May 2012). 
37 Alix, “The Liberian mining law reform,” 2014, op. cit.
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DIFFERENT CONTRACT ROLES
Consistent with expectations, interviews and reviewed 
contracts show that countries that negotiate ad hoc 
contracts tend to see substantial variation in contract 
terms across their mining sector. The variation can 
be attributed to the different types of contract, the 
circumstances under which it was negotiated, when it 
was negotiated, and how it interacts with existing law. 
There is a range of different types of natural resource 
contracts45 and the type used depends on the stage 
of the mining process, the legal regime of the host 
country, the governments and companies involved 
and their needs, and even the political and economic 
dynamics of the era in which they were concluded. 
Mining (Development/Lease) Agreement: Mining 
agreements (or “concession agreements” in civil law 
countries/“conventions” in French) are the most 
prevalent natural resource contracts. Traditional 
mining agreements date to the early 20th century 
before the development of integrated commercial law 
frameworks. They were frequently used in countries 
under colonial control to exempt investors from being 
bound by generally applicable law.46 In transition from 
traditional concession agreements that deferred key 
decisions to the company, these development agree-
ments introduced work requirements and required 
government approval to undertake certain activities.47 
The report found these agreements to generally be the 
most comprehensive in scope. They generally pro-
vide for the granting of exploration and exploitation 
 li censes, though systems where licenses and contracts 
are concluded separately do exist. They may also 
include tax provisions, local procurement require-
ments, the right for the company to process, market 
and sell the minerals it extracts, a company’s commu-
nity development obligations, and provisions for state 
45 This discussion is limited to agreements between the state and 
mining companies. Partnership or joint venture agreements 
without state partners, agreements between companies and 
their lenders or sub-contractors, and other such agreements are 
beyond the scope of this report.
46 James Otto and John Cordes, “The regulation of mineral en-
terprises: A global perspective on economics, law and policy,” 
Chapter 4 (Westminster, Colorado: Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Foundation, 2002).
47 Ibid, 13.
participation and/or control.48 The reviewed mining 
agreement between the government of Cameroon and 
Cam Iron SA, for example, illustrates the agreement’s 
breadth as it explicitly governs: 
“the technical, legal, tax, customs, economic, ad-
ministrative, land, employment and environment 
conditions with a view to the Parties’ performance 
of this Project; and...the main terms and con-
ditions for carrying out the Mining Operations 
within the Exploitation Area.”49
For developing countries with immature legal regimes 
that are not yet able to fully regulate the mining sec-
tor, such mining development agreements may contain 
rules and regulations constituting the law of the pro-
ject. (The issues of negotiation are discussed in greater 
detail earlier in this section.)
Service Agreement: While an example was not public-
ly available from the countries selected for this report, 
a service agreement, as the name implies, is a contract 
in which the government hires a company to perform 
its mining operations, but the government retains con-
trol and ownership of the minerals. These agreements 
were common in the post-colonial era as newly inde-
pendent countries nationalized industries like mining 
that were previously dominated by foreign-owned 
companies. The decision to nationalize the mining 
sector and create a national mining company to run 
it was very political; it signaled a separation from the 
colonial system and was an assertion of sovereignty 
by reclaiming ownership of national assets. However, 
practically, these newly created national companies 
frequently lacked the experience and knowledge nec-
essary to run actual operations, so they hired foreign 
mining companies to do so. The scope of these service 
agreements was frequently less all-encompassing than 
mining agreements and often divided services between 
different providers. The country owned the minerals, 
infrastructure and equipment and the companies were 
compensated either in cash or a share of production 
for their services.50 These types of agreements have 
been less common since the 1990s as the shift towards 
re-privatization of the mining industry began industry 
48 Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining 
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., pp. 41-42.
49 Cam Iron S.A. and Cameroon, Cam Iron Project, Art. 3.1(a) (2012).
50 Otto and Cordes, “The regulation of mineral enterprises,” 2002, 
op. cit.
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led to governments giving up their role as miners and 
only taking on the role of regulator.51
Some countries still utilize service agreements, typical-
ly for retaining foreign companies to provide techno-
logical and other support to the national mining com-
pany that operates the project.52 In the Philippines, full 
state control and supervision in the exploration and 
development of mineral resources are fundamental to 
the country, so the law prohibits the government from 
partnering with mining companies that are not at least 
60% Filipino owned.53 But since the country lacks the 
necessary capital for large-scale mining operations, it 
created the Financial or Technical Assistance Agree-
ment (FTAA) which, as a service agreement, is not 
covered by the restriction and allows the government 
to enter into agreements with wholly foreign-owned 
companies.54
Investment Promotion Agreement: As service agree-
ments were becoming less common, some countries 
began shifting from mining development agreements 
to investment promotion agreements. After the eco-
nomic crises of the 1970s – 1980s, countries began to 
reconsider the state-run approach to management, 
and in the 1990s, there was a legislative shift away 
from such systems towards pre-privatization. This was 
mirrored in the mining sector in a move from the pre-
vious developmental focus of mining contracts toward 
investment promotion. These shifts coincided with a 
period of low commodity prices that created competi-
tion between countries for foreign investment, leading 
to investment promotion agreements. 
These agreements, designed to promote investment, 
were a way of supplementing or supplanting the law. 
Stabilization provisions are a notable focus of these 
agreements because protection for companies from 
arbitrary legislative changes is seen as a key to creating 
an investor-friendly climate.55 Because these agree-
ments can exist outside of the legal regime governing 
mining, they are used even in countries with strict 
mineral licensing systems. Both Peru and Chile have 
51 Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining 
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 31.
52 Ibid
53 Mining Act, Philippines, Sec 3(aq) (1995).
54 “Corporate Representative.” Email interview. 18 March 2015.
55 EY Peru, “Peru’s mining and metals investment guide 2014/2015,” 
(2014).
signed a number of investment promotion agreements 
supplementing the law and stabilizing fiscal terms in 
exchange of the companies paying a higher royalty 
rate than the statutory one. A 2009 agreement between 
Peru and the company Minera Chinalco S.A. analyzed 
for this study guaranteed the company: 
“tax stability in accordance with Art. 80(a) and (e) 
of the general mining law...Moreover, the income 
tax, the method of determining tax rates and the 
tax rates, the compensation for and/or return of 
taxes, customs duties, municipal taxes, exemp-
tions, incentives, and any other benefits relating to 
stabilized taxes and schemes are governed by the 
rules applicable at the date of the signing of the 
contract...The company is not bound by any law 
passed after the date of signature of the contract 
that might directly or indirectly alter the guaran-
tees set out in [this article] of the contract.”56 
Joint Venture: In the context of this report, joint 
venture agreements are contracts where a government 
(often through its national mining company) part-
ners with one or more private companies on a min-
ing project. Mining companies also frequently form 
initial joint ventures among themselves that then sign 
agreements with governments.57 The partnership can 
be an alternative to a debt or equity financing for a 
company trying to raise capital for, or a government 
lacking the expertise necessary for, a mining project.58 
The Manomin tin mine in the DRC is operated by a 
joint venture between DBB Resources Corporation and 
La Congolaise d’Exploitation Miniere, a private limited 
liability company 50% owned by the state.59 
Joint venture agreements were originally one approach 
to asserting a country’s sovereign right over its miner-
als as a post-colonial reaction to the previous regimes. 
In them, government typically exercised control of 
the joint venture via board membership or some other 
contractually defined management system.60 
56 Summary of Art. 9 in the Investment Promotion Agreement 
between Minera Chinalco S.A. and Peru, Chinalco project (2009).
57 Allen & Overy, “Guide to Extractive Industries Documents – 
 Mining,” 2013, op. cit., p. 19.
58 Adam Wanke, “Financing in Difficult Times: Joint Ventures,” Min-
ing Prospects (13 March 2013).
59 DBB Resources Corporation and DRC, Manomin project (2009).
60 Otto and Cordes, “The regulation of mineral enterprises,” 2002, 
op. cit.
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Guinea provides an illustrative example. This study 
reviewed a concession for a bauxite mine the govern-
ment of Guinea signed with the Fria company in 1958, 
the same year it became independent. The concession 
included no provisions for state participation. A second 
agreement reviewed in this study, signed with Com-
pagnie des Bauxites de Guinée (CBG) in 1963, five years 
after independence, while still a concession agreement, 
required a 49% minority ownership share for the gov-
ernment and clearly asserted government ownership of 
mining-related infrastructure even if built by the com-
pany.64 These provisions clearly reflected the post-coloni-
al movement for newly independent countries to assert 
their sovereignty over their resources. Similarly, the con-
tent and focus of joint venture and service agreements 
emphasize the country’s ownership and control. 
Mining development agreements came into fashion in 
the 1970s and 1980s and, as befits their name, empha-
sized provisions requiring upstream and downstream 
economic linkages. While these agreements would all 
include provisions for development, such as infrastruc-
ture development, the terms themselves could vary 
substantially, in breadth, form, and level of detail.65 
Many, if not most, mining development agreements 
include local content provisions of some kind, giving 
preference to local goods and services. 
In this area, investment promotion contracts sharply 
differ from other types of agreements. Local content 
provisions, like most development objectives, can 
be seen as discouraging investment, and thus, such 
provisions tend not to appear in investment promotion 
contracts.66 Additionally, in these contracts, govern-
ment control of the resources, so important in joint 
venture, service, and often development agreements, 
is deemphasized due to concerns about discouraging 
investment. These contracts often include provisions 
limiting the discretion of the government to exercise 
its statutory authority in an effort to limit the risks of 
arbitrary decision-making.67
In the last two decades there has been a return towards 
the development agreement emphasis on mining as 
64 Fria Company and Guinea, Fria project (1958), Harvey Alumini-
um Company and Guinea, CBG project (1963).
65 Otto and Cordes, “The regulation of mineral enterprises,” 2002, op. cit.
66 Xstrata Las Bambas S.A. and Peru, Xtrata Las Bambas project 
(2011); Minera Chinalco S.A. and Peru, Chinalco project (2009).
67 Otto and Cordes, “The regulation of mineral enterprises,” 2002, op. cit.
Production Sharing Agreement: Production sharing 
agreements (PSAs) are fairly rare in the mining sector, 
particularly compared to the petroleum sector where 
they are very common. Their front-loaded nature, al-
lowing higher cost recovery by the company, as well as 
the continuous need for additional capital investment 
as the mineral deposits become more difficult to access 
and extract, makes the production sharing aspect of 
PSAs a poorer fit for mining than for petroleum.61 
Production limits are another common feature of PSAs 
that does not align well with solid mineral mining. 
Only a few countries, such as the Philippines, still use 
them.62 This study reviewed several of the PSAs cur-
rently in force in that country. 
DIFFERENCES IN CONTENT 
Given the range of factors influencing the decision- 
making around mining projects, it can be difficult to 
attribute differences in contract terms to the type of 
agreement. However, agreements often reflect the po-
litical and economic priorities of the era in which they 
were drafted, both in terms of their type and content, 
allowing for the designation of a few identifiers.63 For 
example, service agreements allow for a reassertion 
of state sovereignty in the post-colonial period, while 
investment promotion agreements spur foreign direct 
investment in the mining sector. In turn, joint ven-
ture agreements can help to facilitate the financing of 
expensive mining projects. Analysis of the contracts in 
this study suggests that the differences between agree-
ment types are more readily observable in the priority 
given to or the inclusion/exclusion of, certain terms 
than in the precise substance of the terms themselves. 
61 Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining 
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 31.
62 In the case of the Philippines, the country’s Constitution (1987) 
provides for the government to have full control and supervision 
of the mineral sector, and that the government may enter into 
co-production, joint venture, or production sharing agreements 
to undertake mineral activities where it does not wish to do so 
directly itself. Art. 12(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of the 
Philippines (1987) available at: http://www.gov.ph/constitutions/
the-1987-constitution-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines/the-
1987-constitution-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines-article-xii/.
63 James Otto, “Mineral Agreements,” in The Regulation of Mineral 
Enterprises: A Global Perspective on Economics, Law and Policy 
(Institute for Global Resources Policy and Management Colorado 
School of Mines, 2002).
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an engine of economic development and diversifica-
tion. Decried as “resource nationalism” by companies, 
it is driven by a boom in commodity prices and the 
perception by governments that mining had not been 
producing sufficient in-country benefits. Older agree-
ments are being renegotiated and new agreements now 
might include higher royalty rates, windfall and capital 
gains provisions to ensure countries receive their fair 
share of the benefits of their natural resources.68
 WHEN ARE CONTRACTS USED
“People negotiate agreements because they want conces-
sions in the law. The moment the government says ‘Let’s 
talk,’ the government is saying it is ready to go outside 
the law.” – Government official
A strict hierarchy of legislation exists in the legal 
framework of a country with a licensing regime. A 
country’s supreme law is its constitution, followed 
by its laws, the regulations promulgated pursuant to 
the laws, and then contracts. However, in countries 
with less robust legal regimes and a strong reliance on 
negotiated mining contracts as a result, contracts may 
be specifically designed to supplant all legislation.69 
The implication of this practice is that such contracts 
should not be necessary if and when a country de-
velops a more mature and sophisticated legal regime. 
However, some international advisors have speculat-
ed that this system of negotiated contracts actually 
hinders progress towards such a regime.70 For example, 
those interviewed suggest that the law is most often 
supplanted in relation to fiscal terms. Frequently, the 
tax laws are among the most robustly developed laws 
relevant to the project in developing countries, but 
companies regularly negotiate exceptions to the law to 
profit from better fiscal terms than provided for in the 
country’s legislation.71 
Contracts that supplement or supplant a country’s 
legal framework can differ in content from each other. 
Where contracts supplement the law, the provisions 
being supplemented will be detailed and specific, but 
68 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” 
 (Creative Commons, 2013), p. 73.
69 Ibid.
70 Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining 
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 32.
71 “International Advisor 2.” Telephone interview. 22 April 2015.
other provisions may still make reference to existing 
applicable law. The reviewed agreement between Mon-
golia and Ivanhoe Mines for the Oyu Tolgoi Project, for 
example, supplements the scant local content provi-
sions of Mongolia’s mining law with substantially more 
detailed local content provisions.72 However, in other 
provisions the agreement explicitly defers to Mongo-
lia’s applicable law. An example of this is the following 
provision in the agreement:
“The investor shall comply with the international 
treaties in relation to environmental protection 
matters to which Mongolia is a party and Articles 
35 and 37 of the Minerals Law and shall obtain 
detailed environmental impact assessment reports 
(the “EIA Reports”) in accordance with the Law on 
Environmental Impact Assessment prepared by a 
competent, independent, professional firm.”73
In contracts that supplant the law, the provisions can 
be detailed and specific or scant, but they will not defer 
to the general law. Additionally, agreements supplant-
ing the law usually – and particularly in common law 
jurisdictions – need to be codified into law in order to 
legally take precedence over the law.74 One internation-
al lawyer noted that the use of such agreements can 
also provide clarity on the rules governing the project 
in countries with weak governments. Where a coun-
try’s general law is outdated and needs to be updated 
to reflect current practices, such contracts can provide 
an ad hoc solution until the relevant laws are updat-
ed.75 As countries develop deeper and more robust 
legal frameworks and it becomes increasingly difficult 
to justify supplanting the law, negotiated agreements 
could still be useful in supplementing the law to fill in 
gaps, or where greater specificity is required.76
72 Minerals Law, Mongolia, Art. 43 (2006); Ivanhoe Mines Ltd, Rio 
Tinto International Holdings Ltd. and Mongolia, Oyu Tolgoi 
project, Art. 8 (2009). The agreement was signed under the 2006 
Mining Law which was replaced in 2014; however, both laws 
contain the same local employment requirements.
73 Ivanhoe Mines Ltd, Rio Tinto International Holdings Ltd. and 
Mongolia, Oyu Tolgoi project, Art. 6.1 (2009).
74 The necessity of this is less clear in civil law countries where 
there is a lot of variance on the issue and in some jurisdictions 
non-statutory agreements can supplant general law. James Otto, 
“Mineral Agreements,” in The Regulation of Mineral Enterprises: 
A Global Perspective on Economics, Law and Policy (Institute for 
Global Resources Policy and Management Colorado School of 
Mines, 2002).
75 “International Advisor 2.” Telephone interview. 28 April 2015.
76 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” (Crea-
tive Commons, 2013), p. 14.
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Infrastructure provisions were frequently cited by 
interviewees as benefiting from supplementary pro-
visions in agreements. The mining sector can have 
unique infrastructure needs depending on the loca-
tion and size of a mining development that would be 
difficult to address in a general law.77 Liberia’s mining 
law merely states that mineral rights holders have “the 
right to install any and all industrial infrastructure 
necessary for and incidental to mine or quarry oper-
ations, in accordance with prevailing standards of the 
mining and quarry industries worldwide, this law and 
the regulation.”78 The agreement for the Western Clus-
ter iron ore project is used to go into much more spe-
cifics, requiring the company to build a two-lane, as-
phalt paved, all-weather road connecting Tubmanburg 
and the Mano River and a railroad from the mines to 
the port. It also reserves ownership for the roads and 
the fixed assets of the railroad for the government, 
while requiring the company to maintain them.79 
Similarly, third-party usage of infrastructure is often 
dealt with through such supplementary agreements.80 
Liberia’s mining law again merely states that company 
infrastructure “within the area subject of the mineral 
rights may be used by government or third parties 
provided however, that fair compensation shall be paid 
and that such use does not interfere with or hinder 
the [company’s] operations.”81 The Western Cluster 
agreement then again supplements that with sub-
stantial provisions detailing third party access to the 
project’s port, railways and power supply, how fees for 
use will be set and the costs and revenues divided.82 As 
addressed later in this paper in the discussion of key 
terms, the specificity of these provisions to the project, 
its needs and location make it infeasible to establish 
them in a generally applicable law.83 
Project specificity can also require supplementing 
agreements establishing the minimum mineral output 
level a company is required to maintain. This is an 
example of a provision that can be difficult to set out 
in legislation because it will depend on factors specific 
77 “International Advisor 2.” Telephone interview. 22 April 2015.
78 Minerals and Mining Act, Liberia, Art. 20.10 (2000).
79 Western Cluster Ltd. And Liberia, Western Cluster project, Arts. 
6.1, 6.6, 6.7 (2011).
80 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 23 April 2015.
81 Minerals and Mining Act, Liberia, Art. 12.1 (2000).
82 Western Cluster Ltd. And Liberia, Western Cluster project, Arts. 
6.1, 6.6, 6.7 (2011).
83 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 23 April 2015.
to the mine site, the mineral being mined, the market, 
etc.84 Local community provisions, from development 
to resettlement, were also mentioned as often needing 
supplementing agreements due to their specificity.85 
One expert interviewed also raised the debt-to-equi-
ty ratio as a provision that, due to weak laws and the 
dangers of tax avoidance, could often benefit from a 
supplementing agreement.86 
Several experts with experience advising developing 
country governments noted that, in practice, once a 
country allows the possibility of negotiating an agree-
ment with supplementary provisions, it can easily find 
itself with a final agreement that supplants the law.87 
Companies, seeing that there is room to negotiate can 
often use political pressure or political connections to 
expand what is available for discussion, and achieving 
terms that are in conflict with the law.88 Strong politi-
cal will, clear limits on the discretion of the negotiat-
ing team, as well as strong public accountability can 
all help guard against such scenarios.89 The agreement 
with Ivanhoe Mines for the Oyu Tolgoi Project is one 
such example. At the time, the mining law allowed for 
the negotiation of an agreement on tax stabilization 
only, but the company made additional requests such 
as investment allowances not foreseen by the law. 
However ultimately parliament refused those changes 
and the contract only supplements the law.90
Stabilization Clauses: Both the research and the inter-
views found that one of the most frequent (and conten-
tious) mechanisms for supplanting the law is including 
stabilization provisions in the contracts.91 The study’s 
contract matrix shows stabilization clauses take one 
of two forms. First, there are those that exempt the 
company from being bound by new laws or regula-
tions that might be enacted that negatively impact the 
company’s rights and obligations under the agreement. 
This is the type of clause the study found Sierra Leone 
still negotiating, even as it builds its mineral govern-
ance including the passage of the Mines and Minerals 
Act of 2009. The government’s agreement with London 
84 Ibid.
85 “International Advisor 2.” Telephone interview. 22 April 2015.
86 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 23 April 2015.
87 “International Advisor 1.” Telephone interview. 28 April 2015.
88 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 12 March 2015.
89 Ibid.
90 “International Advisor 1.” Telephone interview. 28 April 2015.
91 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” (Crea-
tive Commons, 2013), p. 102.
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Mining for an iron ore project exempted it from paying 
the statutory tax rate.92 Meanwhile the stabilization 
clauses in agreements negotiated prior to the law, such 
as the one with Sierra Rutile Limited specifically sup-
planting any laws (including the subsequent 2009 Act) 
in instances where the provisions of law are inconsist-
ent with those of the agreement, remain in effect.93 
A typical example of this type of clause comes from 
Guinea’s Zogota agreement:
“The government warrants the company from the 
date of grant of the concession and throughout its 
full duration the stabilization of current legisla-
tion and of all provisions, particularly fiscal and 
concerning customs and excise, stipulated in this 
agreement. Accordingly, all changes to current 
legislation, particularly fiscal and/or concerning 
customs and excise, after the date of grant of the 
concession that would as a result increase, whether 
directly or indirectly, the company's tax and/or 
customs and excise charges would not be applica-
ble for it. 
On the other hand, the company may validly take 
advantage of such changes if their effect is to re-
duce its tax and/or customs and excise charges.”94
This type of stabilization clause can be a politically 
contentious issue as it is seen as inhibiting a country’s 
sovereignty by restricting the government’s ability 
to make and pass laws. Such far-reaching exemptions 
from the application of new laws and regulation in-
cludes environmental and social regulations, poten-
tially preventing the government from adopting and 
requiring current environmental best practices for all 
of the country’s mining projects.95
The second type of stabilization attempts to establish 
economic equilibrium. It does not exempt the com-
pany from application of new laws or regulations, but 
entitles it to be compensated by the government for 
any materially adverse financial effects it suffers as a 
result. Typically, if changes favor the company, it is al-
92 London Mining Company and Sierra Leone, London Mining 
project (2012).
93 Sierra Rutile Ltd. and Sierra Leone, Rutile project (2001).
94 BSG Resources and Guinea, Zogota project, Art. 32 (2009).
95 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” 
 (Creative Commons, 2013), p. 102.
lowed to enjoy those benefits.96 See the RV Investment 
agreement in Azerbaijan: 
“The rights and interests accruing to [the company] 
under this agreement and its sub-contractors under 
this agreement shall not be amended, modified or 
reduced without the prior consent of [the company]. 
In the event that any governmental authority invokes 
any present or future law, treaty, intergovernmental 
agreement, decree or administrative order which con-
travenes the provisions of this agreement or adverse-
ly or positively affects the rights or interests of [the 
company] hereunder, including, but not limited to, any 
changes in tax legislation, regulations, or administra-
tive practice, or jurisdictional changes pertaining to 
the contract area, the terms of this agreement shall be 
adjusted to re-establish the economic equilibrium of 
the parties, and if the rights or interests of [the compa-
ny] have been adversely affected, then [the state-owned 
mining company] shall indemnify [the company] for 
any disbenefit, deterioration in economic circum-
stances, loss or damages that ensue therefrom.”97 
Increasingly, stabilization clauses, when used at all, are 
heavily circumscribed to apply only to specific fiscal 
provisions and only for specific lengths of time tied to 
the time necessary for a company to repay its financ-
ing. Guinea recently limited stability to tax provisions 
and for a maximum of 15 years and Burkina Faso is 
considering limiting tax stability to no more than 20 
years.98 Shorter, more focused stabilization also helps 
address the administrative difficulties these provisions 
can cause by creating varying contracts with varying 
tax provisions that must be overseen and enforced by 
institutions frequently operating under severe capacity 
limitations. 
In some countries stabilization clauses require com-
panies to accept higher tax rates. In Chile and Peru, 
two countries with strong legal frameworks and where 
mineral rights are granted through a strict licensing 
regime, both allow for stabilization agreements to 
supplement the law. Companies that want such agree-
ments are required to pay additional taxes or royalties, 
96 Allen & Overy, “Guide to Extractive Industries Documents – 
 Mining,” 2013, op. cit., p. 12.
97 RV Investment Group Services, LLC and Azerbaijan, Kedabek 
gold mining project, Art. 21 (1997).
98 Norton Rose Fulbright, “West Africa’s wave of mining reform,” 
(January 2014).
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essentially a fee for the increased fiscal protection. No 
companies in Chile have as of yet been willing to do so.99
Contracts for Exceptional Circumstances: Experts say 
there can be rare occasions where a project is so large 
it warrants the exceptional regulation of a negotiated 
agreement,100 though some international experts point 
out the criteria for what constitutes an exceptional 
project is not clearly defined.101 Generally speaking, 
they would be projects of such significant scale that 
the existing legal regime related to mining, taxation, 
transportation, etc. proves inadequate. For instance 
longer leases than provided by existing law might be 
required; special provisions around water rights or 
power generation might be necessary. In these circum-
stances, a negotiated agreement could allow the needed 
flexibility to make the project feasible. 
The clearest examples of such situations are in Austral-
ia. The use of negotiated agreements, which were then 
enacted into law through special agreement acts, in 
Australia really began in the 1950s when its legislation 
was largely outdated or inadequate for dealing with 
large-scale mining projects, particularly those involv-
ing substantial construction of infrastructure. The 
agreements allowed for terms suited to the circum-
stances of such projects without requiring immediate 
legislative reforms, which would have been a time 
consuming process of piecemeal amendment of nu-
merous statutes. They were generally used for massive 
projects of major economic importance. Restrictions 
on the state’s ability to borrow money prevented them 
from financing the infrastructure, requiring a mech-
anism for securing private investment. The required 
scale and infrastructure investment were typically 
the determinative factors in the decision to negotiate 
an agreement.102 In 1968 for example, the government 
of Queensland passed the Central Queensland Coal 
Associates Agreement Act which ratified the agreement 
establishing four mines to develop coal deposits in the 
Bowen Basin which would eventually supply more 
than half of the country’s coal exports. An agreement 
was used because the mines required the construc-
99 Sachs, Toledano, Mandelbaum, with Otto, “Impacts of Fiscal 
Reforms on Country Attractiveness,” 2012, op. cit., p. 360
100 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 9 March 2015; 
“Corporate Lawyer.” Telephone interview. 4 March 2015.
101 “International Advisor 1.” Telephone interview. 22 April 2015
102 Anne Fitzgerald, “Mining Agreements: Negotiated Frameworks 
in the Australian Minerals Sector”, Prospect Media, p. 8 (2001).
tion of towns, railways and a coal port. In contrast, 
the Blackwater mine in that same Bowen Basin was 
licensed under the Coal Mining Acts because it had 
access to existing infrastructure.103 Other rationales 
for negotiated agreements in Australia include the 
infeasibility of granting the necessary access to the 
land, to water resources or providing the certainty of 
tenure the project requires through generally applica-
ble legislation. 
Agreements can also facilitate the obtaining of better 
financing for companies by signaling the govern-
ment’s commitment to and support for the project.104 
Project costs in developing countries or in remote 
locations can be quite high, necessary infrastructure 
often doesn’t exist, higher operating costs mean higher 
initial capital expenditures and the country’s rule 
of law and bankruptcy protections may be weak. In 
those circumstances companies, their investors and 
financiers desire reassurance they can recover their 
investment.105 An agreement, not only stabilizing fiscal 
provisions or signaling the government’s support for 
the project but also implicitly endorsing the company’s 
ability to develop and manage it, mitigates some of the 
risk and can lower the cost of financing. They provide 
even greater authority and security if they are codified 
into statutory law.106
Australia has been criticized for lacking clear crite-
ria on when it is appropriate to negotiate, and the 
agreements have been subject to many of the criti-
cisms leveled at negotiated agreements in developing 
countries. An independent review commissioned by 
the government in 2002 found public concern about 
the lack of public involvement in negotiations and the 
committee recommended a substantially reduced role 
for state agreements.107 In practice they have already 
become much rarer.108 One expert interviewed suggest-
ed that because tax laws are federal, these provincial 
government agreements did not provide sufficient 
guarantee for companies or benefits for government 
103 Ibid, 42.
104 Hillman, “The Future Role for State Agreements,” 2006, op. cit.,  
p. 298.
105 “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 21 April 2015.
106 “Corporate Lawyer.” Telephone interview. 29 April 2015; Otto, 
2002, op. cit.
107 Hillman, “The Future Role for State Agreements,” 2006, op. cit., p. 
294.
108 “Corporate Lawyer.” Telephone interview. 29 April 2015.
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and so have been largely discontinued.109 Of the two 
major mining states, Queensland has not entered into 
any such agreements since the 1980s, and according to 
several experts Western Australia has also not done so 
in a number of years.110
BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF 
 NEGOTIATING CONTRACTS 
Among those interviewed, negotiating agreements is 
generally not a well thought of approach to natural 
 resource management at the moment. When asked 
about recommended best practices for negotiating 
mining contracts, one mining lawyer with extensive 
experience advising governments quipped, “avoid 
negotiated agreements.”111 As more and more coun-
tries move towards licensing regimes you hear very 
few justifications for negotiation. One is to facilitate 
extremely large mining projects requiring special 
accommodation as discussed above. Those instances 
are rare.112 The other situation where negotiation is 
still widely used is in countries with a nascent mining 
sector and/or an underdeveloped legal framework for 
minerals. 
Sierra Leone offers one such example. After it emerged 
from its civil war in the early 2000s it was a post-con-
flict country, with little infrastructure, weak institu-
tions and a desperate need for investment and devel-
opment. The government faced a difficult choice. It 
could wait to open the country to mining and spend 
years and resources it didn’t have trying to develop 
its capacity, its mining, environmental, tax and labor 
legal frameworks, and its governance mechanisms 
with no guarantees it would pay off or it could forge 
ahead knowing it is not an ideal scenario in the hope 
that a successfully negotiated mining project would 
help them develop that capacity while also providing 
economic growth, revenue, development and employ-
ment opportunities. Given the intense need, the public 
pressure to show results and the country’s political 
109 “International Advisor 1.” Telephone interview. 28 April 2015.
110 Fitzgerald, “Mining Agreements,” 2001, op. cit; “The Future Role 
for State Agreements,” Hillman, 2006, op. cit; “Corporate Lawyer.” 
Telephone interview. 13 March 2015; “International Advisor 1.” 
Telephone interview. 28 April 2015.
111 “International Advisor 1.” Telephone interview. 28 April 2015.
112 “Corporate Lawyer.” Telephone interview. 4 March 2015; "Inter-
national Advisor.” Telephone interview. 11 March 2015.
instability the government made the decision to nego-
tiate agreements.113 
Unfortunately, the research suggests the same cir-
cumstances forcing governments to negotiate con-
tracts make negotiation a dangerous proposition. 
Inexperience and a desperate need for investment and 
development put governments in very poor bargain-
ing positions. Asymmetrical information and a poor 
understanding of the complexities of the agreement 
undermine negotiations. Weak central government 
and public institutions hamper government coordina-
tion and management. Capacity restraints and the high 
cost of enforcement hinder effective oversight.114 In 
these contexts, negotiated agreements can create their 
own issues: 
113 “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 19 March 2015.
114 Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining 
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 34.
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Discretion: One of the most common criticisms of 
negotiated agreements is the significant discretion it 
gives to a small number of people to conclude wide 
ranging and potentially lucrative deals, often with lit-
tle to no oversight, public consultation, or transparen-
cy. Oftentimes negotiations are conducted by someone 
at the ministerial level or higher, and these are political 
appointees who may lack the necessary knowledge in 
this area.115 These are fertile conditions for corruption. 
If negotiations are going to be conducted, the govern-
ment needs an advisory board or an inter-ministerial 
commission that includes high-ranking representatives 
from all relevant ministries.116 Its composition, man-
date and decision-making process should be enshrined 
in legislation to give added weight to its authority, but 
even then it is no guarantee of success. 
The current laws in Sierra Leone allow less discretion 
than they did a decade ago. Its legal framework has 
evolved.117 Yet the licensing process is vague, compa-
nies negotiate directly with the Ministry responsible 
for mining and the Minister still appears to be able to 
grant mining licenses at his discretion.118
Countries that negotiate contracts are increasing-
ly dealing with the issue by narrowing the scope of 
that discretion. Both legislation restricting the terms 
that are open to negotiation and using model min-
ing agreements can limit the risks that go along with 
wide-ranging discretion. A model mining agreement 
is currently being developed in Sierra Leone for these 
reasons.119 (The trend towards model mining agree-
ments is discussed further later in this report.)
While strong correlations should not be drawn be-
tween the rankings of the study countries on Trans-
parency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
(see Box) and their choice in mineral rights regimes, 
it does show that the study countries with the lowest 
levels of corruption in their public sectors also tend to 
use licensing regimes. We note here that discretion and 
corruption are not issues exclusive to contracts. A licens-
ing regime might restrict discretion through standard 
terms set out in the generally applicable mining laws, 
115 “International Advisor 1.” Telephone interview. 28 April 2015.
116 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” 
 (Creative Commons, 2013), p. 23.
117 “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 19 March 2015.
118 “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 10 March 2015.
119 Ibid.
but that does not necessarily extend to the ancillary 
agreements related to the project. Several interviewees 
from Australia mentioned preferential treatment for 
a company in the form tax breaks or exemptions in 
infrastructure agreements related to mining projects 
as a past issue.120
Confidentiality: Given that mining agreements involve 
publicly owned resources and can have significant 
repercussions for a country’s development, mining 
agreements are not just contracts concluding com-
mercial terms; they are public policy documents as 
well. Yet, they have historically been seen as strictly 
confidential, and in some past instances, they were not 
shared with even the ministries that had responsibil-
ities and obligations stemming from the agreement’s 
terms.121 The stability of an agreement requires those 
subject to it to accept it as legitimate. That, in turn, 
requires knowledge of what it contains.122 
In the last decade, there has been a powerful move-
ment away from that approach and towards the 
transparency of agreements between governments 
and mining companies. The Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), an initiative promot-
ing the open and accountable management of natural 
resources has gained tremendous traction. Forty-eight 
countries now implement EITI and another 32 comply 
with its requirements, including the countries pub-
lishing detailed reports on the mining revenue they 
receive. EITI also encourages its members to publish 
their mining contracts.123
Countries increasingly are now publishing their 
mineral agreements, including a number in this study. 
Afghanistan, DRC, Guinea, Liberia, Mozambique and 
Sierra Leone all now publicly release their mining 
agreements. Peru, which uses a licensing regime for 
its mineral rights, does publish its investment pro-
motion agreements which are sometimes used for 
mining projects (see explanation above). This trans-
parency can be due to legislative requirement (Liberia 
120 “Corporate Lawyer.” Telephone interview. 4 March 2015; 
 "Corporate Lawyer.” Telephone interview. 16 March 2015.
121 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” 
 (Creative Commons, 2013), p. 204.
122 Sachs, Toledano, Mandelbaum, with Otto, “Impacts of Fiscal 
Reforms on Country Attractiveness,” 2012, op. cit., p. 380.
123 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, available at: eiti.org 
(last visited on 31 March 2015).
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and Mozambique), voluntary commitments (DRC and 
Guinea), or as the result of the ratification of agree-
ments in Parliament (Sierra Leone and Liberia). Recent 
contracts in Guinea, Liberia and Mongolia reviewed 
for this study have even included clauses specifically 
making them public.124 In other instances, companies 
have made agreements public through the filings and 
disclosures they are required to make to be listed on 
various stock exchanges, including several mining 
agreement between SEMAFO and the government of 
Burkina Faso.125 
The study found no indications supporting a basis 
for fears that contract disclosure will have a chilling 
effect on investment. Liberia, for example, has signed 
a number of large mining agreements since enacting 
legislation to require public disclosure of the agree-
ments. Disclosing contracts might initially appear to 
conflict with the confidentiality provisions included 
in many contracts, but most restrictions typically 
focus on protecting commercially sensitive data and 
information, the definition of which usually does not 
include the contract itself.126 Countries like Guinea that 
have retroactively made its contracts public have not 
experienced any issues.127 
The reality is that many “confidential” agreements are 
already available, albeit often on expensive commercial 
databases regularly used by companies. As more than 
one government advisor observed, companies have ac-
cess to other companies’ contracts either through their 
lawyers, experts, databases or because they communi-
cate with each other or because in countries like Sierra 
Leone where contracts are ratified in Parliament, they 
are public. This allows them to compare terms and ask 
the government during negotiations to explain why 
the terms are different.128 This is another area where 
the government suffers from asymmetrical informa-
124 BSG Resources and Guinea, Zogota project (2009); African Aura 
Resources Ltd. and Liberia, Aura project (2004); Western Cluster 
Ltd. And Liberia, Western Cluster project (2011); Ivanhoe Mines 
Ltd, Rio Tinto International Holdings Ltd. and Mongolia, Oyu 
Tolgoi project (2009).
125 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” 
 (Creative Commons, 2013), p. 205.
126 Allen & Overy, “Guide to Extractive Industries Documents – 
 Mining,” 2013, op. cit., p. 15.
127 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” (Crea-
tive Commons, 2013), p. 207.
128 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 2 March 2015; 
Sachs, Toledano, Mandelbaum, with Otto, “Impacts of Fiscal 
Reforms on Country Attractiveness,” 2012, op. cit., p. 380.
tion. In that context, disclosing agreements publicly 
only helps with the information asymmetry between 
companies and governments.129
Such transparency efforts are also intended to improve 
governance and accountability and through public 
accountability combat the risks created by discretion. 
As one government official posited, there are only two 
explanations for poor agreements: corruption or a lack 
of capacity and experience on the part of the govern-
ment.130 Transparency can address not just the former 
but also to some extent the latter, by making the agree-
ments available to those with the capacity to analyze 
and bring attention and scrutiny to poor agreements.131 
This is particularly true when contracts are ratified by 
parliament. If properly done, the legislative discussion 
on the contract and opportunity for greater public 
involvement allows for oversight and review before 
the contract is finalized and implemented. It can allow 
for broader support and answer the frequent criticism 
that the public was not involved in negotiations. In 
Mongolia, after review Parliament sent the Oyu Tolgoi 
Project agreements back to the government to make 
changes.132 Clearly, transparency efforts are having 
some success in mitigating the issue of discretion in 
contract negotiations, but in the present they are still 
insufficient.133 
Corruption, lack of political will, or simple logistical is-
sues can keep contracts hidden even in countries with 
transparency laws. Afghanistan’s new Minerals Act 
does not require the publication of all mining agree-
ments, preventing civil society organizations (CSOs) 
from accessing certain mining contracts of interest to 
them.134 In Sierra Leone, contracts are published on-
line, but the country’s high illiteracy rate and low level 
of Internet penetration render them unavailable to 
large sections of the population.135 In many cases when 
contracts are available, domestic education efforts are 
still needed to enable the public to understand the 
often complex agreements. The time and effort re-
quired of CSOs and the public to hold the government 
129 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 23 April 2015.
130 “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 21 April 2015.
131 Ibid; “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 23 April 2015.
132 “International Advisor 2.” Telephone interview. 28 April 2015.
133 “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 21 April 2015.
134 “Civil Society Representative.” Telephone interview. 24 March 
2015.
135 “Civil Society Representative.” Telephone interview. 17 March 
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accountable for the terms of each negotiated contract 
still currently remains much more significant than in a 
licensing regime with its uniform terms.136  
Implementation and Monitoring: Negotiating terms 
for a mineral agreement often focuses on not only 
provisions like the rate of income tax, but also the defi-
nition of income. Negotiating is determining what can 
be deducted against income, what losses can be carried 
forward, or how to calculate base rates to determine 
royalties. Everything could be open for discussion and 
thus every contract a government negotiates can be 
different down to a definitional level. For a country 
lacking the institutional capacity to monitor and en-
force a uniform law, properly monitoring and enforc-
ing a range of differing contractual terms is a practical 
impossibility. Companies are aware of this, and it may 
undermine what little leverage the government may 
have.137
Governments need to think strategically in addressing 
these challenges during the negotiations. The imple-
mentation and administration of mining contracts 
can be made easier if the government negotiates terms 
that are best suited to its capacities and limitations.138 
They should also negotiate for the inclusion of pro-
visions to address key implementation issues such as 
requiring periodic auditing by an international auditor 
or forensic accounting (at the company’s expense) and 
strict penalties.139 The government should also develop 
compliance manuals, detailing all of its obligations 
under an agreement.140 At the same time, governments 
should be developing implementing institutions, such 
as Sierra Leone’s National Minerals Agency. This is part 
of a long-term process of capacity building, including 
bringing professionals to staff the institutions, even if 
it requires paying higher rates than other civil serv-
ants and offering education support and training to 
increase the pool of available domestic skills.141 (Imple-
mentation is discussed further later in this paper.) 
 
136 “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 21 April 2015.
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Undermining rule of law: Perhaps one of the greatest 
problems presented by negotiating contracts is the risk 
it creates of hindering the growth, or even actually 
undermining the stability, of a country’s legal frame-
work. There is some basis for concern. Negotiating 
agreements that depart from, or even supplant the law 
upset the hierarchy of law. In situations where the legal 
framework is weak or insufficient to properly regulate 
the mining sector, agreements often include terms in 
the contract provisions that should be enshrined in 
the law.142 Not only can this open terms for negotiation 
that shouldn’t be, such as environmental protection 
provisions, it can also result in the transfer of the 
government’s administrative and regulatory responsi-
bilities to the company.143 The government abdicating 
its duties to a company creates a situation ripe for 
regulatory inaction, thereby preventing needed evo-
lution and undermining trust in an unresponsive and 
stagnant legal regime.144 
The government maintaining its administrative and 
regulatory powers may not bolster the stability of law 
either. The terms of many of these agreements put 
the government in a difficult position of conflicting 
interests: having an interest in the financial success 
of a mining project, while simultaneously required to 
act as a regulator and enforcer of laws and regulations 
that could negatively impact the profits it is hoping to 
share. This would be a difficult balance for government 
regardless, but even more so in a country where the 
weakness of its administrative and regulatory institu-
tions necessitated negotiating agreements in the first 
place.145 Even in situations where the government is 
successful in balancing these countervailing interests, 
the situation creates the risk of being perceived as 
favoring companies and profits over enforcing the law. 
That can be a significant political risk, particularly 
as countries with weak institutions frequently also 
experience a lack of confidence in government by the 
public. These risks are not limited to government. 
Negotiated contracts can be closely linked in con-
tent or perception to the officials or government that 
142 Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining 
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 34
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negotiated them.146 Following political turnover, new 
governments have found it politically expedient to, or 
have had public license to, re-examine the terms of 
contracts negotiated by their predecessors.147 
Necessary efforts to develop and strengthen the coun-
try’s legal regime as well as the government’s adminis-
trative and financial management capacities can often 
be stymied by a system of negotiated agreements that 
prevents coherent treatment of parties and the general 
applicability of the law.148 
Sanctity of Contract: While drafting and amending 
legislation and regulations can be a slow process, laws 
are not set in stone and can be amended, repealed, or 
supplemented over the course of the life of a mining 
project, causing uncertainty as to the terms. To min-
imize the risk of unfavorable changes in law, particu-
larly to the fiscal provisions, companies may strong-
ly favor stabilization provisions. In a similar vein, 
companies may strongly resist government requests 
for an amendment to the contract provisions on the 
basis that this violates the terms of the deal the parties 
negotiated and that both parties should be required to 
honor (“sanctity of contract”).149 However, in practice, 
while companies may protest when requested to revisit 
a provision by their state counterpart, companies are 
equally likely, if not more so, to request amendments 
to the mining agreements to accommodate the chang-
ing circumstances over the life of a mining project. 
Contracts, no matter how well drafted, are unlikely 
to be adapted to meet all the needs of a multi-decade 
project without the flexibility to be amended from 
time to time.
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In response to many of the issues with contracts, there 
is a growing trend towards limiting what is negotiable. 
Many interviewees argued that the logical conclusion 
of this shift is a pure licensing regime where all terms 
are set out in legislation and regulations. But that can 
be a long process and in the interim an option that 
has been gaining a lot of traction as a bridge between 
a pure licensing regime and negotiable contracts is a 
model mining agreement.150 Indonesia for example 
went through a number of generations of model agree-
ments before eventually converting to a pure licens-
ing regime in 2009.151 One senior government official 
described a model agreement as “the way forward” for 
Sierra Leone, one of a number of countries developing 
a model agreement.152 
The experts interviewed have found that drafting a 
model mining agreement is a faster and easier process 
than the typically lengthy process of drafting, enact-
ing or amending the numerous laws and regulations 
necessary to create the strong legal framework required 
for an effective licensing regime. This is true even if the 
model agreement is enacted into law (a practice that is 
recommended to allow for parliamentary review and 
greater public discussion).153 Liberia’s Model Mineral 
Development Agreement is in its Revenue Code.154
The model is similar to a form contract in that it pro-
vides the general structure of the agreement and most 
terms, all of which are non-negotiable, while including 
carefully delimited areas that are open for negotia-
tion, such as royalty rates within a certain range and 
community development and work commitments. It 
strengthens the government’s position by narrowing 
the focus of negotiations. One of the lawyers who 
developed the Model Mining Development Agreement, 
a collection of example provisions from existing mine 
development agreements, pointed out that a smaller 
range of negotiable issues that the government team 
has to be knowledgeable on helps alleviate the gov-
ernment’s capacity issues. A model agreement that 
limits negotiations to the percentage of income tax 
150 Sachs, Toledano, Mandelbaum, with Otto, “Impacts of Fiscal 
Reforms on Country Attractiveness,” 2012, op. cit., p. 381.
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 (Creative Commons, 2013), p. 35.
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153 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 5 March 2015.
154 “Liberia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – Annual Progress 
Report,” International Monetary Fund, p. 18 (February 2012).
as opposed to the definition of income tax can keep a 
government negotiating team from becoming over-
whelmed, despairing and then just signing the agree-
ment, something that has been known to happen. 
A model agreement can take away a lot of the risk for 
inexperienced government teams by restricting the 
opportunities for discretion and limiting the impact 
of external pressure on the negotiation. It can facili-
tate faster and more efficient negotiations. A number 
of international advisors and government officials 
noted that often the most difficult part of negotiations 
is reaching internal government consensus. Having 
a model agreement can ease that process. They also 
provide the opportunity to standardize key terms 
across a country’s future agreements, which would 
be a significant step towards addressing the capacity 
problems exacerbated in many developing countries by 
having to implement and monitor different terms for 
every project.155
Model agreements give the government the opportu-
nity to present their terms to companies as opposed 
to being presented with and negotiating off of the 
company’s draft agreement. Working off a company’s 
proposal not only starts negotiations from the compa-
ny’s perspective but uses their terms and definitions, 
which can lead to inconsistencies between different 
agreements within a country and increase the chal-
lenges of administration.156 
Having a model mining agreement still requires the 
government to possess the political will to require 
companies to negotiate based on the model and to 
refuse to open the non-negotiable terms up to discus-
sion.157 An effective model agreement has to be well 
drafted and has to have the support of government. 
Basing negotiations off of a poor model agreement 
and/or allowing non-negotiable provisions to be mod-
ified as a result of political pressure from the company 
can result in the same problems of negotiations that 
lack a model.158 These issues, though far from solely 
responsible, reportedly contributed to the original, 
heavily criticized contract between the government of 
155 International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 23 April 2015.
156 Ibid.
157 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 5 March 2015; 
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Liberia and Mittal Steel.159 Governments report that 
companies presented with model mining agreements 
often claim its project is unique and too different to 
fit under the model. While there might be certain 
extremely large projects that don’t fit within the model 
agreement, several interviewed experts believe the vast 
majority can be dealt with through it.160 The model is 
designed to establish the basic terms while allowing for 
the necessary project specifics to be negotiated.161 
If given proper government attention a well-drafted 
model agreement can be developed relatively quickly. 
If contracted to an international expert, it could be 
done in as little as a few weeks. If it is a more complex 
situation or involves extensive stakeholder engage-
ment, for example, it could take a year or two.162 
However, unlike a contract negotiation with a com-
pany, there is no pressure on a government to move 
quickly to finalize a model agreement, so the process 
can take much longer than it should. Even when 
unnecessarily lengthy, the development process for a 
model agreement is substantially faster and easier than 
drafting and enacting the legal framework required for 
a licensing regime.163 For this reason, countries might 
stop their efforts after finalizing their model mining 
agreement and not seek to strengthen their laws.
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table Mineral Development Agreement between the Govern-
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160 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 9 March 2015.
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The comparative review and analysis of the texts in 
the legislative and contractual matrices illustrated that 
key mining provisions are broadly similar, but their 
placement in legislation or agreements often reflects a 
country’s legal regime governing mining, underlying 
gaps in the law, and the varying motivations behind 
the choice to address an issue in an agreement instead 
of the law. Even when they are included in mining 
agreements, the type of agreement used can also vary 
depending on a range of factors, including but not lim-
ited to the priorities of the country, the era in which 
the agreement was signed, the investment climate, 
and the political, economic and geographical circum-
stances of the project. The following sets out the key 
provisions related to mining projects as well as how 
and where they are typically dealt with in different 
KEY PROVISIONS LEGISLATION CONTRACT
Fiscal Provisions
Bonuses Generally seen in contracts
Royalties Commonly seen in both Commonly seen in both
Progressive Fiscal Terms Starting to be introduced in law
Capital Gains Commonly seen in both Commonly seen in both
Tax Exemptions Poorly suited for contracts
State Participation Commonly seen in both Commonly seen in both
Environmental and Social Provisions
Impact Assessments Seen in both but applied differently Seen in both but applied differently
Water Rights Commonly seen in both Commonly seen in both
Community Development Appears more frequently and with greater detail in contracts
Linkages
Procurement Basics established in law Often supplement the law
Training Basics established in law Often supplement the law
Employment Basics established in law Often supplement the law
Technology Transfer Basics established in law Often supplement the law
Value Addition Basics established in law Almost always in contracts
Infrastructure Basics established in law Often supplement the law
Third-Party Usage Basics established in law Often supplement the law
Other
Term Generally set in law
Stabilization Almost always in contracts
Confidentiality Almost always in contracts
Dispute Resolution Almost always in contracts
Periodic Review Almost always in contracts
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regimes. When discussing the inclusion of terms in the 
law versus in contracts, those terms that do or should 
appear in legislation should be considered relevant to 
licensing regimes.
FISCAL PROVISIONS 
One of the challenges for a government is designing a 
fiscal regime that balances the need to attract foreign 
investment with capturing a fair return from the 
country’s natural resources. Individual fiscal terms 
must be considered in the context of the overall fiscal 
regime. Royalties serve a different purpose than 
income tax. Some are designed to generate revenue 
immediately with the start of production, others, like 
income tax can take years to generate revenue for the 
government. Some fiscal provisions require higher 
levels of administrative capacity than others. 
Decisions on the fiscal regime and how to impose it 
should be tailored with an understanding of the capa-
bilities of the government to implement and enforce 
what are usually quite complex provisions.164 Fiscal 
provisions are one of the most likely rationales for a 
regime that allows agreements to supplant or amend 
existing law. This can be because, for companies, the 
fiscal provisions are the priority. According to one 
expert, it can also be because generally the most devel-
oped law in a developing country is its tax law. For that 
same reason, agreements complementing legislated 
fiscal terms are less common.165
Royalties: Royalties are unique to resource extrac-
tion and traditionally the sector’s primary, and most 
controversial, form of taxation.166 In the study coun-
tries, royalties have been addressed in both agreements 
and legislation. While companies generally think of 
royalties as a tax, many countries consider royalties 
to be compensation for the company’s right to exploit 
and profit from the country’s non-renewable mineral 
resources. For that reason, royalties in these countries 
tend to be set forth in the mineral laws and overseen 
by the ministries responsible for mining. In countries 
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like Peru and the Philippines that consider royalties a 
form of excise tax, royalties are governed by the fiscal 
laws and administered by the finance ministries and 
the tax collection authorities.167
Enshrining royalty rates in the law can allow countries 
to standardize them across all minerals. Some coun-
tries, frequently ones with older mining laws, apply 
varying royalty rates depending on the mineral. This 
approach is based on old sovereignty issues from the 
period when the law was enacted and the government 
viewed certain minerals as more valuable or more 
important to the country than others. A number of 
countries with such laws, such as Zambia, have stand-
ardized those royalty rates in recent years.168 
The critical issue for governments charging royalties is 
ensuring an accurate valuation of the minerals being 
sold. Mineral sales valuation has proven susceptible to 
manipulation through mechanisms such as transfer 
pricing, where companies use below-market sales to 
affiliated companies to establish an artificially low base 
for calculating royalty payments.169 To combat such is-
sues, it is critical for governments to require companies 
to sell to affiliated companies at the same prices they 
would if it were an “arm’s-length transaction.” Sierra 
Leone’s Mines and Minerals Act state: 
“[T]he holder of a mineral right shall make sales 
commitments to affiliates only at prices based on 
or equivalent to arms length sales to non-affiliated 
purchasers and in accordance with such terms and 
conditions on which agreements would be made if 
the parties had not been affiliated.”170
To ensure this occurs governments must establish a 
fixed point where valuation should be measured and 
ensure that measurement accurately determines the 
minerals value. Liberia failed to take these steps in the 
rather infamous Mittal Steel agreement, which clearly 
illustrates the dangers that can come from negotiat-
ing fiscal provisions. Its royalty provision stated: “The 
concessionaire shall pay to government in dollars a 
royalty at the rate of four point five (4.5%) percent of 
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
169 World Bank Centre for Exploration Targeting, “How to Improve 
Mining and Tax Administration and Collection Frameworks:  
A Sourcebook,” (April 2013).
170 Mines and Minerals Act, Sierra Leone, Art. 154.2 (2009).
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the invoiced sales of iron ore FOB Yekepa.” Despite 
the reference to the FOB (free on board) price, the 
agreement does not specify how the iron ore should be 
priced or require an arm’s length transaction, ceding 
the power to set the sales price. Since royalties are cal-
culated based on sales price, under the agreement the 
company could sell iron ore to an affiliated company 
at artificially low prices which would decrease its tax 
burden and enable it to pay the government extremely 
low royalties.171 
Progressive fiscal terms like windfall tax, resource rent 
tax: Progressive taxes like sliding scale royalties, windfall 
taxes or resource rent taxes are flexible fiscal mecha-
nisms that can self-adjust to fluctuating commodity 
prices, and they can ensure that countries participate 
in increased profits when commodity prices rise (in the 
case of price-based sliding scale royalty or windfall tax) 
or when costs decrease and the return increases (in the 
case of the Resource Rent Tax (RRT). Such taxes are not 
yet common and only recently have countries started 
to introduce them in legislation. Licensing regimes such 
as Peru and Chile have included progressive taxes as 
part of mining law reforms, though Peru has since had 
to revisit and refine its approach.172 Thus progressive 
fiscal terms are not often seen included in contracts. 
Ecuador’s recent Ecuacorriente agreement for example, 
simply states the company is bound to the 70% tax on 
windfall profits set out in its tax law.173 
Capital Gains: Extracting ore is not the only way a 
company can profit from a mine. The projects or min-
eral rights themselves can be an incredibly valuable 
asset for a company. In 2011 Rio Tinto bought Riv-
ersdale Mining and its coal reserves in Mozambique 
for US$ 3.9 billion. Governments are under increased 
pressure to ensure that it sees a share of the proceeds 
of these sales. In response, countries are increasingly 
attempting to impose a tax on capital gains companies 
receive from the sale of, or as a result of their rights 
to, state mineral assets.174 Some countries impose this 
tax through legislation, often tax legislation, such as 
171 The contract was heavily criticized globally and was renegotiated 
– and largely rewritten – in 2007. Global Witness, “Heavy Mittal? 
A State within a State,” 2006, op. cit.
172 Sachs, Toledano, Mandelbaum, with Otto, “Impacts of Fiscal 
Reforms on Country Attractiveness,” 2012, op. cit., p. 360.
173 Ecuacorriente, S.A. and Ecuador, Ecuacorriente project, Arts. 18.3 
(2012).
174 John Skoulding, “Capital Gains Tax – The New Resource Nation-
alism,” Oil Council (September 2012).
Canada. Burking Faso is considering a new law that 
will impose a 20% capital gains tax on any transfer 
of mining title.175 The approach of other countries 
has been to include provisions in mining agreements 
requiring governmental approval of any change of 
control of a company with mineral rights, including 
indirect changes such as sale of a controlling interest 
in an external parent or holding company.176 Recent 
agreements in Mongolia and Liberia reviewed for this 
study contain capital gains tax provisions.177 Including 
such provisions in agreements can be a useful interim 
solution to the problem in situations where legislation 
on capital gains tax does not exist, but where legislation 
does exist, addressing capital gains in an agreement cre-
ates an opportunity to negotiate exceptions to the law. 
The annex to the Cam Iron Agreement in Cameroon for 
example gave the company a three-year exemption to 
capital gains tax.178  
Signature Bonus: Bonuses are a fiscal element com-
monly included in negotiated contracts. They are pay-
ments of fixed, lump-sum amounts usually triggered 
by specific events. The most common are signature 
bonuses, paid on the signing of the agreement. These 
bonuses are popular with governments but can be 
unpopular with companies because they are payable 
years before a project becomes profitable, if it ever 
does at all. The analysis of legal frameworks found 
that a signature bonus is rarely required by law in the 
study countries. In Cameroon, where the reviewed law 
made no provision for such payments, the 2012 Cam 
Iron agreement included a US$ 11 million signature 
bonus.179 Even in the rare instances where it is required 
by law, such as the DRC, the amount of the bonus is 
negotiated in the contract. In the reviewed Manomin 
agreement for example, the DRC government required 
a US$ 5 million signing bonus.180
175 Mayer Brown Legal Update, “Issues in relation to mining projects 
in Burkina Faso,” (November 2014).
176 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” (Crea-
tive Commons, 2013), p. 84.
177 Ivanhoe Mines Ltd, Rio Tinto International Holdings Ltd. and 
Mongolia, Oyu Tolgoi project (2009); Western Cluster Ltd. And 
Liberia, Western Cluster project (2011).
178 Cam Iron S.A. and Cameroon, Cam Iron project, Annex VII, Art. 3 
(2012).
179 Cam Iron S.A. and Cameroon, Cam Iron Project, Art. 36(3)(a) (2012).
180 DBB Resources Corporation and DRC, Manomin project, Art. 11.5 (2009).
36
Tax Exemptions: Often, in an effort to attract foreign 
investment with a competitive tax regime, govern-
ments will include tax incentives in their mining 
agreements. These incentives, which might include 
tax holidays, loss carryforward rules, and accelerated 
depreciation that all decrease the taxable income, can 
improve the feasibility of marginal projects and pro-
mote investment in exploration. These incentives also, 
however, delay the government receiving revenue from 
the projects.181 
Tax incentives are poorly suited for inclusion in agree-
ments where they are susceptible to the risk of corrup-
tion, asymmetrical information, and expertise dis-
parities; instead, they should be incorporated into tax 
codes.182 It is estimated that Sierra Leone for example 
will lose an average of US$ 44 million per year between 
now and 2016 as a result of tax incentives granted to 
mining companies.183 The agreements the country 
negotiated with the companies London Mining and 
African Minerals included favorable departures from 
Sierra Leone’s corporate income tax rate.184
State Participation: State involvement in the extrac-
tion of its resources has always been an important and 
frequently contentious question between governments 
and companies that usually requires negotiation.185 
State ownership of its resources and the use of nation-
al mining companies in the 1960s and 1970s was an 
outgrowth of post-colonialism politics. State equity 
participation was less of a priority during the era of 
privatization without ever going away, and recent years 
have seen its return to a prominent position. As gov-
ernments focus on optimizing the benefits of mining 
to spur development, the training, employment, and 
technology transfer opportunities provided by state 
181 Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining 
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 34.
182 Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Invest-
ment, World Bank, and ICA Consulting, Background Paper for 
the Eighth Columbia International Investment Conference on 
Investment Incentives: The good, the bad and the ugly, Assessing 
the costs, benefits and options for policy reform, November 2013.
183 One.org, “British mining companies’ exploitation in Sierra 
 Leone,” (7 November 2014).
184 London Mining Company and Sierra Leone, London Mining 
project, Art. 5.3 (2012); African Minerals Ltd. and Sierra Leone, 
Tonkolili project, Art. 19 (2010).
185 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 23 April 2015; Louis 
Wells, “Government-held equity in foreign investment projects: 
Good for host countries?” Columbia FDI Perspectives, (3 February 
2014).
equity participation offer an avenue to create econom-
ic linkages.186 
One way to ensure state participation is through joint 
venture agreements. The Manomin JV agreement in 
DRC and Aurifere de Guinee in Guinea give the re-
spective government an equity stake in the respective 
joint venture company and the opportunity to build 
economic linkages. But a country could also acquire a 
stake in a company through a non-joint venture nego-
tiated agreement.
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL 
 PROVISIONS
Arguably the biggest trend in mining in recent decades 
has been the rise to prominence of environmental and 
social issues. Mining operations have historically been 
associated with significant negative impacts on the 
environment. Their social impacts are more complex. 
Impact assessments, community development, human 
rights, and corporate social responsibility are receiving 
increased public scrutiny and are being included in 
both mining legislation and contracts.187 
Impact Assessments: Almost all study countries 
require mining companies either in legislation or in 
contracts to conduct some version of an environmental 
and social impact assessment (ESIA) as a requirement 
for operations. They are a critical part of the project 
design phase, identifying potential problems, consid-
ering how to mitigate them, and incorporating those 
considerations into the project’s planning. 
ESIA requirements can be established in domestic leg-
islation or in the mining agreements, and that place-
ment can result in different applications. In a licensing 
regime such as Zambia, an EMP or a variation thereof 
is a requirement for application and it will be evaluated 
as part of the approval process for granting the license. 
In contract regimes, the design and requirements of 
ESIAs and EMPs are terms to be negotiated and only 
conducted after an agreement is concluded, often mak-
ing them perfunctory exercises. 
186 Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining 
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 34.
187 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” 
( Creative Commons, 2013), p. 114.
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ESIA requirements can be included in mining agree-
ments to supplement gaps in the law. For example, in 
the Philippines contracts reviewed for this study, the 
1992 PSA included an environmental impact require-
ment. Following the introduction of such provisions in 
the 1995 Mining Act, subsequent PSAs did not include 
their own impact assessment requirements.188 Howev-
er, it is not uncommon to see ESIA provisions in both 
legislation and agreements in the same jurisdiction. 
Including ESIA requirements in an agreement even if 
it is already provided for under the law can comple-
ment the law and provide an avenue for remedy in the 
case of a violation by the company that is not covered 
under the ESIA provisions of the law.189 
It is also not unusual to find ESIA requirements in-
cluded in both the environmental and mining law of 
a country.190 Sierra Leone’s Environmental Protection 
Act (EPA) examined in this study requires environ-
mental impact assessment (EIA) licenses for mining 
projects. The completion of an EIA is also one of the 
conditions for obtaining a large-scale mining license, 
and the EIA must contain “the types of information 
and analysis reflecting international mining best prac-
tices.”191 
Water Rights: Mining projects require a tremendous 
amount of water and, if not properly managed, may 
have substantial impacts on water resources in their 
areas of operation. In regions where water is scarce, a 
project’s usage could lower the water table and leave 
local communities with inadequate access to water.192 
Some agreements address this by simply referring the 
company to “pertinent laws, rules and regulations.”193 
In some agreements, you can see the water rights pro-
visions in negotiated agreements supplement the law 
as the government’s understanding of the issue evolve 
over the course of several iterations. Liberia’s 2000 
188 Case Construction PSA, 1992, Art. 10.1(l); Mining Act, 1995, Art. 
70; Vincent Tan Tiong and Philippines, Tiong project, Art. 13.1 
(2009); Mt. Sinai Mining Exploration and Development Corpora-
tion and Philippines, Mt. Sinai project (2011).
189 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” 
 (Creative Commons, 2013), p. 124.
190 Ibid.
191 Mines and Minerals Act, Sierra Leone, Art. 131 (2009); Environ-
mental Protection Act, Sierra Leone, Art. 18, (2000).
192 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” (Crea-
tive Commons, 2013), p. 115.
193 Mt. Sinai Mining Exploration and Development Corporation and 
Philippines, Mt. Sinai project, Art. 11.2 (2011).
Mining Act merely states that unless otherwise specified 
in the agreement a mineral license gives the company 
the right of “use of water and other resources necessary 
for the execution of the work.”194 The 2004 agreement 
with African Aura Resources, Ltd. builds slightly on 
that, allowing the company to “extract as much water 
as required so long as it doesn’t deprive the surround-
ing community from a constant and reasonable water 
source.”195 A year later another agreement supplements 
the law further limiting the company to the: 
“right to remove, extract and use water…provid-
ed, however that the [company] shall not deprive 
any person of a constant and reasonable supply of 
usable water from a previously utilized traditional 
source without replacing it…”196 
Liberia’s Regulations Governing Exploration Licenses 
in 2010 limited companies to using water within the 
license area “solely to the extent reasonably necessary 
for exploration if the Licensee does so in accordance 
with applicable environmental laws,” as well as pro-
hibited companies from depriving “any person (even 
temporarily) of a constant and reasonable supply of us-
able water from a previously utilized traditional source 
without replacing it, or interfere with any water rights 
enjoyed by any user under any agreement with the 
Government.”197 The agreement with Western Cluster 
Ltd. the following year again supplemented the new 
regulations, expanding and extending them beyond 
the exploration stage: 
“The company shall not deprive any person of a 
constant and reasonable supply of usable water 
from or pollute a previously utilized traditional 
source without providing an alternative source of 
substantially the same quality and quantity, nor 
shall the company, without the Minister’s consent 
and at least 30 days prior notice to the affected 
communities, interfere with any water rights 
enjoyed by any user under any agreement with the 
government made prior to the date of execution of 
this agreement.”198 
194 Minerals and Mining Act, Liberia, Art. 6.7(d) (2000).
195 African Aura Resources Ltd. and Liberia, Aura project, Art. 6 
(2004).
196 Mittal Steel NV and Liberia, Mittal project, Arts. 9.3, 27.1 (2005).
197 Regulations Governing Exploration Licenses, Liberia, Art. 7.3 (2010).
198 Western Cluster Ltd. And Liberia, Western Cluster project, Arts. 
6.3 (2011).
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Even these protections remain insufficient, a compa-
ny’s use or discharge of water remains conditional on 
it adopting the most water efficient management pro-
cedures and implementing a mechanism for recycling 
or reuse of water, but the example illustrates the role 
agreements can play in supplementing the provisions 
of a legal regime that is by nature slower to develop.199 
Community Development Agreements: In an effort 
to ensure that local and affected communities see 
some benefit from the mining projects, countries are 
increasingly requiring companies to sign community 
development agreements (CDAs) and sometimes to 
establish community development funds. While provi-
sions requiring CDAs can be included in either law or 
mining agreements, in the contract regime countries 
examined, the detailed terms and provisions these 
separate agreements need to include were much more 
frequently detailed in the mining agreements.200 In 
some countries with strong licensing regimes and in-
digenous populations, including Canada and Australia, 
the law requires consultation with the indigenous 
communities and allows companies to negotiate di-
rectly with, and make fund payments directly to, these 
communities.201 For those countries, these agreements 
are rare instances of negotiations in otherwise strict 
licensing-based regimes.202 
ECONOMIC LINKAGES AND LOCAL 
 CONTENT
In the last decade, the idea that mining should be an 
engine of broad-based growth and development has 
reemerged. As laid out in the African Mining Vision, the 
key to this broad development is optimizing its linkages 
199 Perrine Toledano and Clara Roorda, “Leveraging Mining Invest-
ments in Water Infrastructure for Broad Economic Develop-
ment: Models, Opportunities and Challenges,” CCSI Policy Paper, 
(March 2014).
200 Sierra Leone is one of the few countries that has tried to include 
detailed CDA requirements into Law (http://www.sdsg.org/
wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Sierra-Leone-Mines-Miner-
als-Act-2009.pdf) and adopt a model CDA http://www.nma.gov.
sl/content.php?p=show_news&id=73 - While having the virtue of 
making mandatory some fundamental principles of CDAs, this 
process is also criticized for making CDAs a box ticking exercise 
for companies and not being flexible enough to accommodate 
community-specific needs.
201 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” (Crea-
tive Commons, 2013), p. 145.
202 “Corporate Lawyers.” Telephone interview. 17 March 2015.
to local economies.203 Instead of focusing on maximiz-
ing government revenue from mining, countries should 
focus on obtaining optimal benefits. In this strategy, 
governments can sacrifice some short-term fiscal bene-
fits for medium-to-long-term non-fiscal benefits. In this 
context, the ability to negotiate, if done correctly, can be 
quite beneficial in giving the governments the flexibility 
to optimize economic linkages.204 
One way to optimize a mining operation’s linkages to 
local economies is through local content provisions. 
They aim to develop a competitive local workforce, 
create employment opportunities for citizens, facilitate 
the transfer of technology, and advance the domestic 
private sector.205 The need to grow the desired econom-
ic linkages while maintaining the economic viability 
of different projects can require a level of flexibility 
difficult to achieve solely in generally applicable law. 
As discussed above, local content provisions need to 
be specific to the project, and a number of experts and 
government officials interviewed believe that negoti-
ated agreements can complement generally applicable 
laws with more detailed provisions.206 
Employment: A case in point comes from the Philip-
pines: In the Philippines, the Mining Act requires com-
panies to give preference to qualified Filipino citizens. 
PSAs like Mt. Sinai and Vincent Tan Tiong go further 
in requiring their companies to create time-tables for 
achieving certain percentages of Filipino citizens at all 
levels of employment.207
Training: To achieve the local employment require-
ments, most of the agreements in this study also in-
clude requirements for the training of nationals. These 
requirements, which typically include creation of a 
plan for training and promotion of staff, and require-
ments that the company replace expatriate staff with 
local employees who have completed that training, are 
203 African Union,“African Mining Vision.” African Union. (February 
2009).
204 “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 19 March 2015.
205 Local Content Laws and Contractual Provisions, Columbia 
Center on Sustainable Investment, available at http://ccsi.colum-
bia.edu/work/projects/local-content-laws-contractual-provi-
sions.
206 “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 22 April 2015.
207 Mining Act, Philippines, Art. 62 (1995); Mt. Sinai Mining Explo-
ration and Development Corporation and Philippines, Mt. Sinai 
project, Art. 13.1 (2011); Vincent Tan Tiong and Philippines, Tiong 
project, Art. 13.1 (2009).
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often negotiated in agreements.208 The minimum an-
nual expenditures for training when required are often 
set in agreements.209
Technology Transfer: In the study countries, technol-
ogy transfer provisions appear much more frequently 
in contracts than in the reviewed legislation. Joint 
venture agreements are by design particularly suited to 
encourage technology transfer. 
Procurement: Local procurement provisions are often 
dealt with in agreements. The success of these provisions 
is dependent on solid drafting. The definition of what 
are “best efforts”, what constitutes a contractor, a good 
or service from that country, or what is meant by “local” 
and “competitive” must be carefully defined to avoid 
questions of interpretation and ensure the appropriate 
parties benefit. This is an area where countries could 
benefit from model mining agreements that ensure such 
key terms are well defined and standardized. 210
Addressing these provisions in agreements can create 
problems for countries that are members of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), as the national treatment 
obligation clause of the WTO prevents foreign com-
panies from being forced to purchase local goods or 
services if a better quality or priced alternative exists 
outside the country. Local procurement provisions 
in those countries often only require preferential 
treatment and do not or cannot specify sanctions for 
noncompliance.211
Value Addition: Most local content provisions are 
“upstream” linkages, designed to incorporate local 
involvement in mining and mine supporting operations. 
But local content also includes “downstream” linkages 
designed to provide value addition to the raw materials 
being mined.212 Beneficiation and other value addition 
activities are attractive to governments because of 
208 Semafo Burkina Faso S.A. and Burkina Faso, SEMAFO project, 
Arts. 6, 7.1 (2007); “International Advisor.” Telephone interview, 
23 April 2015.
209 Cam Iron SA Agreement, Arts. 10.16, 32.3-6,33.1-3, Mittal Steel 
Agreement, 2005, Art. 11-13; Koidu Holdings SA and Sierra Leone, 
Koidu Kimberlite project, Art. 10,11 (2010).
210 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 5 March 2015.
211 Ana Maria Esteves, Bruce Coyne, Ana Moreno, “Enhancing the 
subnational benefits of the oil, gas and mining sectors,” Revenue 
Watch Briefing, (July 2013).
212 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” 
 (Creative Commons, 2013), p. 159.
the economic benefits, but they can be very expensive 
operations with very low-profit margins, making them 
economically unfeasible in many cases.213 They are also 
very project specific and so are generally dealt with in 
agreements where they can be contentious negotiation 
points. One executive recounted his company’s “end-
less” debates with the government in Liberia that was 
advocating for local beneficiation provisions during ne-
gotiations. The two sides ultimately agreed to a require-
ment that the company undertake a feasibility study.214 
Liberia’s agreement with Western Cluster Ltd. for an 
iron ore mine included a representative provision illus-
trating the specificity required for value-addition:
“The Company will work towards and assist the 
Government in achieving the policy of the es-
tablishment or expansion of downstream metals 
processing facilities in Liberia in relation to pel-
letization or other further beneficiation, refining 
and/or metals manufacturing and fabricating (to 
the extent not already carried out by the Com-
pany pursuant to an approved Feasibility Report) 
if, in light of recognized economic, technical and 
scientific standards, the Iron Ore mined by the 
Company is amenable to such additional activities 
and provided it is economically and practically fea-
sible to do so… 
Within five years of first production the Company 
must finance a pre-feasibility study for the estab-
lishment in Liberia of a facility for the next value 
added step in the transformation of Iron Ore into 
steel. “Value added” means at a minimum both an 
increase in value and an increase in purity (grade) 
of the Product(s) of the Company’s Mine(s). If at 
the time of the study the parties cannot agree on 
the appropriate next value addition step or steps, 
the parties will select an international expert in 
iron and steel production to define the appropriate 
focus of the pre-feasibility study, with the costs of 
such expert to be shared equally by the Govern-
ment and the Company.”215
213 Ibid.
214 “Corporate Representative.” Telephone interview. 6 March 2015.
215 Western Cluster Ltd. And Liberia, Western Cluster project, Arts. 
6.5 (2011).
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Infrastructure: One of the biggest challenges to min-
ing in developing countries is infrastructure.216 Large-
scale mining projects have tremendous infrastructure 
demands to bring heavy machinery, equipment, sup-
plies, and staff to the mining site and mined ore from 
the site. Transportation infrastructure including roads, 
railways, airstrips or even seaports might be required. 
There will be tremendous energy, water, communi-
cations and other logistical needs. Frequently, little 
of this is available at often remote mining sites at the 
beginning of projects. If it does not exist or is not in 
usable shape, it will have to be built or refurbished.217 
As discussed above, due to the unique infrastructure 
needs of each project and their significant scale and 
costs, infrastructure was regularly cited by interview-
ees as frequently needing the flexibility and specificity 
provided by mining agreements.218 In some instances, 
separate infrastructure agreements are required to 
supplement the mining license. In Mozambique, the 
Moatize coal mine was put out for tender separately 
from the tender for the project to construct a railway 
to transport the coal. This separation can be problem-
atic however, and has caused severe logistical con-
straints for the Moatize mine.219 
As explained above, third-party access to infrastruc-
ture is another instance where agreements are often 
negotiated to supplement the law. One way to increase 
economic linkages is to require companies to give third 
parties the right to access certain infrastructure to the 
extent that it does not interfere with the companies’ 
operations. Governments can even mandate certain 
routes for roads or railroads or locations for infra-
structure such as power plants to increase its benefit 
for third parties.220 The agreement between Ivanhoe 
Mines and the government of Mongolia provides for 
third party access to certain public use infrastructure/
services including, “roads, power, water/heating sys-
tems, water drawing facilities…schools, hospitals…an 
airport [and] community centers.” Ivanhoe is allowed 
to recover the costs of this access by charging tolls for 
216 “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 21 April 2015.
217 Allen & Overy, “Guide to Extractive Industries Documents – 
 Mining,” 2013, op. cit., p. 7.
218 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 23 April 2015; 
“Government Official.” Telephone interview. 21 April 2015.
219 “Corporate Lawyer.” Telephone interview. 4 March 2015; “Thai 
Company at Advantage in Bidding for New Railway,” AllAfrica.
com (4 August 2013).
220 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 23 April 2015.
its usage.221 Some companies have argued that having 
to share infrastructure with third parties who may 
have different standards for usage and maintenance 
can jeopardize a company’s supply chains, and in some 
agreements, they still negotiate for an exclusive right to 
use and to decide who else may use infrastructure it has 
constructed.222 The very specific nature of these rights 
and how they might benefit third parties require agree-
ments, but the conflicting priorities of the company 
and the government on this provision can result in very 
lengthy negotiations.223 The agreement for the Siman-
dou iron ore project in Guinea took a number of years, 
in part due to negotiations over the 650km railway and 
deep-sea port the project required and their availability 
for third-party access.224
OTHER PROVISIONS
Term: The duration of a mining agreement is typical-
ly either for a set period of time as established in the 
agreement or by legislation, or for the economic life of 
the mine. DRC has done both, awarding licenses for the 
life of the mine in its joint venture projects, and using 
fixed terms in its mineral agreements.225 The purpose 
of both systems is to offer companies a sufficiently 
long period to allow it to recoup its investment and 
make a profit.226 
In study countries, fixed terms, which are more widely 
used and decreasing in length, are usually set in the 
mining laws or regulations. In the only country where 
agreements included a different length of term than 
in the legislation, Afghanistan, the law allowed for 
exploitation licenses for up to 30 years initially and the 
221 vanhoe Mines Ltd, Rio Tinto International Holdings Ltd. and 
Mongolia, Oyu Tolgoi project, Arts. 7.14, 7.16 (2009).
222 ”Corporate Executive.” Telephone interview. 19 March 2015; 
Allen & Overy, “Guide to Extractive Industries Documents – 
 Mining,” 2013, op. cit., p. 8.
223 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 23 April 2015.
224 Mark Aplin and Glen Ireland, “Will Simandou Deliver on the 
Promise of Shared-Use Mining Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica?” Infra Share, June 2014; “International Advisor.” Telephone 
interview. 23 April 2015.
225 DBB Resources Corporation and DRC, Manomin project (2009); 
Entreprise Minière de Kisenge Manganese, Cluff Mining Ltd. and 
DRC, Kisenge Manganese project (1998).
226 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” (Crea-
tive Commons, 2013), p. 20.
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agreements under that law actually restricted it to an 
initial 10 years.227 
Stabilization clauses: Stabilization provisions, which 
are discussed in a previous section on when contracts 
are used, are largely unique to contracts. Unlike other 
key terms, interest in its inclusion is almost exclusive 
to companies and can be one of their primary motives 
in seeking a contract. In a few rare cases such as Chile 
and Peru, the legal framework provides for the possi-
bility of stabilization clauses that supplement the law 
in exchange for higher tax or royalty rates.228 
Confidentiality: To this point, confidentiality provi-
sions have generally been addressed in contracts not 
legislation. As transparency increases, countries are 
approaching it in different ways. Some countries, in-
cluding Liberia and Mozambique now require contract 
disclosure in legislation. Other countries prefer includ-
ing clauses requiring public disclosure of contracts in 
the contracts themselves that can then be ratified.229 
The latter solution is seen as a quicker solution than 
passing a transparency law or amending an existing 
law.
Dispute Resolution: Dispute resolution mechanisms 
such as international arbitration (which is discussed in 
greater detail later in this paper) are generally seen in 
contract regimes where they are addressed in mining 
agreements. It is more often addressed there instead of 
in legislation because typically it is the company which 
desires its inclusion. This is common in developing 
countries where a company is concerned about the 
competence and independence of its judicial system.230 
The mining acts in Liberia and Mozambique, as well as 
the proposed new mining law in Afghanistan reviewed 
for this study, all expressly defer to the contracts to set 
their own dispute mechanisms.231 Dispute resolution 
227 Minerals Act, Afghanistan, Art. 34 (2010); Khoshak Brothers 
Company and Afghanistan, Western Garmack Coal Occurance, 
Art. 3 (2012); Afghan Krystal Natural Resources Company and 
Afghanistan, Qara Zaghan Gold project, Art. 3 (2011).
228 Sachs, Toledano, Mandelbaum, with Otto, “Impacts of Fiscal 
Reforms on Country Attractiveness,” 2012, op. cit., p. 360.
229 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” 
 (Creative Commons, 2013), p. 205.
230 Allen & Overy, “Guide to Extractive Industries Documents – Min-
ing,” 2013, op. cit., p. 16.
231 Minerals Law, Afghanistan, Art.92 (2012); Minerals and Mining 
Act, Liberia, Art. 19 (2000); Mining Law, Mozambique, Art. 8.2 
(2014).
mechanisms can also sometimes be set out in invest-
ment treaties, agreements between states setting out 
terms and conditions for investment by the companies 
of one country in the other.232
Periodic Review: As discussed above, periodic review 
provisions are an obligation imposed on the parties 
to meet on a regular basis, upon request of one of the 
parties or following a trigger event. While this type of 
provision can be set in law in Tanzania, if it is included 
in contracts it can be more detailed, specifying the 
trigger events and the variables to be adjusted to adapt 
to the change in circumstances.
232 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” (Crea-





This section of the report examines the experience of 
preparing for, negotiating, drafting, and implementing 
mining contracts and legislation. It includes informa-
tion drawn from 44 interviews with 39 government 
officials, company representatives, external advisors, 
and civil society members on their experiences in the 
entire process of negotiating mining contracts in 18 
countries. The report examines negotiation prepara-
tion activities such as the building of the negotiating 
teams and consultations with stakeholders. It reviews 
the negotiation itself, including points of contention 
within the agreement and issues that affect negotia-
tions. Post-negotiation issues, such as implementation 
and monitoring, renegotiation, the use of model agree-
An executive who led the company team during the 
negotiation of an iron ore project in a West African 
country in the late-2000s related his experience:
The government had a large negotiation team that was 
well advised and was working off of a model develop-
ment agreement. Nevertheless, negotiations were slow 
and lasted almost two years. It took a year to get the 
government to engage fully with the company and have 
concrete talks. Following three months of negotiation, 
there was a six-month period with little progress or 
communication, followed by another two months of 
negotiation before there was an agreement. This was 
highly problematic for the company because it was con-
ducting exploration during these negotiations for the 
mining concession, and the longer the process took, the 
more the company was spending on exploration with 
no guarantee of reaching an agreement.
In part, the slow pace of negotiations was the result 
of several factors. The government’s negotiating team 
included seven government ministers or equivalent 
officials. They were frequently distracted or called 
away by their other responsibilities. Capacity was also a 
problem, but this was mitigated to some degree by the 
government retaining experienced external advisors. On 
some points the company consulted with those advisors 
directly before negotiating with the government which 
made the process easier. The company had prepared 
for the negotiation by determining its opening posi-
tions and how far it would move on key issues. With 
that mandate, the company’s negotiating team came 
in with a fair amount of discretion. The government’s 
team did not have that same mandate.The power-centric 
approach to politics in the country and a lack of trust 
between officials on the government team restricted the 
team’s authority to agree to terms. The government’s 
negotiation team also excluded representatives from 
the region where the project was located. Local leaders 
were so frustrated by their exclusion that they actually 
reached out to the company to ask for a seat at the table.
Another obstacle was the short-term focus of both sides. 
Individual government officials were seeking to secure 
political capital and company negotiators wanted to 
please their superiors by “winning” the negotiation. That 
approach requires a “loser” which undermines the long 
term prospects for the agreement. Approaching it as a 
partnership would have been better.
There were several particular points of contention dur-
ing the negotiations. The first centered on local benefi-
ciation, which is frequently an issue during negotiations 
around iron ore. The other was over periodic review of 
the agreement. From the company’s perspective, nego-
tiation is an uncertain, expensive, and time-consuming 
process that generates unnecessary uncertainty for its 
investment. The company neither wants nor sees the 
need to repeat that process in only a few years. Instead, 
the company preferred a pre-agreed to sliding-scale 
royalty or windfall tax.
Once the negotiations concluded and project operations 
began, the company did not refer to the agreement at 
all as so much of it concerned future goals that would 
not be relevant for the project for some time. The gov-
ernment came under heavy criticism for the deal and 
the general public perception was that it conceded too 
much.233
233 “Corporate Representative.” Telephone interview. 6 March 2015.
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ments and the question of external assistance, are also 
considered. 
PREPARING FOR CONTRACT 
 NEGOTIATIONS
While the term “negotiation” tends to evoke images of 
people arguing across a long table (an essential aspect of 
any negotiation), the majority of the negotiation process 
is spent doing equally (if not more) important work in 
advance away from the table, including but not limited 
to conducting research and studies, drafting terms, re-
viewing the other side’s proposed terms, and achieving 
internal consensus. Ideally, for governments and com-
panies, walking into the negotiating room should be the 
culmination of many months or even years of advance 
work, and if the parties successfully reach an agreement, 
that is just the start of the work of implementation.234 
In many instances however, negotiations end in flawed 
agreements that are not in the interests of the country, 
precisely because the necessary preparatory work for 
negotiations, including feasibility studies and asset eval-
uations, was not carried out by the government. 
Ideally, from a company perspective, unless it is ne-
gotiating an agreement for a surveyed or established 
mineral deposit, it generally will have spent a consid-
erable amount of time and resources merely determin-
ing if there is even something to negotiate over. The 
company must conduct airborne geophysical surveys, 
mapping, and seismic analysis, often under reconnais-
sance permits, even just to identify potential sites for 
deeper exploration.235 
If a mineral deposit is found, best practice, according 
to corporate representatives interviewed for this study, 
would have the company’s project development team 
step in and conduct pre-feasibility and feasibility stud-
ies. The company would need financial analyses, includ-
ing the development of a financial model that predicts 
the return on investment at different commodity prices. 
Mine design and site risks would need to be considered. 
Mining projects – particularly in developing countries 
– tend to operate in an enclave where they supply their 
own power, water, transport and ICT infrastructure, 
234 ”Corporate Executive.” Telephone interview. 19 March 2015.
235 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” 
 (Creative Commons, 2013), pp. 37-40.
but a project that might require a substantial additional 
infrastructure component, such as railways or a port for 
the export of bulk commodities, introduces additional 
complexities and requires even more analysis.236 The 
company would need to understand the political inter-
ests of the government, particularly the ruling party, as 
well as the political environment.237 In an ideal scenario 
the company would also conduct social, environmental 
and human rights impact assessments to understand 
and mitigate such risks. Realistically speaking, compa-
nies generally only conduct such assessments if required 
by law or internal company policy. Human rights im-
pact assessments are particularly rare.238 
On the other side, in an ideal scenario, the government 
would be performing its own due diligence during this 
time. It is not enough to have a potential investor in 
the country’s mining sector; it needs to be the right 
kind of investor.239 Taking the time and effort to target 
and attract a world class investor with a history of 
success and a strong environmental, health and human 
rights track-record can be quite a political dilemma 
for a developing country. On one hand, as is often the 
case, it is in desperate need of the investment, devel-
opment, employment opportunities and revenue that 
can come from mining and its government can be 
under intense political pressure to deliver those results. 
On the other hand simultaneously, weak institutions, 
political instability, recent past conflicts, or rumors of 
widespread corruption often mean that the country 
is considered high-risk, and as such is only attracting 
high-risk investors, junior companies, or companies 
with questionable records. Caught in this catch-22, it 
is tempting for a government to go after the quick re-
source flows and make a deal with the first company to 
arrive, setting a potentially dangerous precedent. The 
early investors and initial agreements set the tone for 
the sector and the wrong companies playing signifi-
cant roles in the mining sector can attract more of the 
same and discourage responsible investors.240
236 ”Corporate Representative.” Telephone interview. 6 March 2015.
237 “Corporate Representative.” Telephone interview. 9 March 2015.
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If the company did not provide the necessary informa-
tion in the process of seeking a license, the government 
should investigate the company’s past experience, 
expertise, finances, environmental and human rights 
records, etc. Best practice would have it require the 
company to share its feasibility report.241 The goal is 
to uncover anything that could potentially prevent a 
company from fulfilling its obligations. This exercise 
is particularly important for small junior companies 
or privately-held company suitors whose record is not 
as transparent or well documented as publicly-listed 
companies. This research can, and often is, done by 
the government itself, but thorough due diligence can 
be a complex process, and governments often lack the 
necessary expertise and capacity. In such cases govern-
ments could choose to hire outside firms that special-
ize in such investigations.242
CONSULTATIONS WITH STAKEHOLDERS 
In addition to these preparations, many of those in-
terviewed emphasized that both sides should consult 
with other stakeholders, particularly sub-national 
governments, CSOs and local communities in the area 
of the proposed project. There is increasing interna-
tional recognition that local communities must be 
consulted and made part of public decisions that will 
affect them, and the principle of free, prior, and in-
formed consent (FPIC) protects the right of indigenous 
 peoples to also be consulted on matters that can affect 
their interests.243 Governments and companies should 
ideally continue this engagement throughout the 
process, though this is frequently reported not to be 
the case. While on rare occasions CSOs might be in the 
negotiating room – Afghanistan EITI was present as 
an observer during past negotiations – most likely the 
opportunity for local communities, indigenous peo-
ples, and CSOs to make their concerns heard will come 
during pre-negotiation consultations.244 A civil society 
representative noted that the government engaged 
with them in advance of negotiations for a mining 
agreement. However, despite the CSO’s efforts to have 
local communities included in the actual negotiations, 
241 “International Advisor 1.” Telephone interview. 22 April 2015.
242 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” (Crea-
tive Commons, 2013), p. 48.
243 Negotiations Portal for Host Country Governments, available at: 
www.negotiationsupport.org (last visited 31 March 2015).
244 “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 4 March 2015.
they were not consulted in any way during talks, nor 
did the government or the company come back after 
the deal was completed to inform the people what was 
agreed to.245 
Not only are consultations critical to achieving FPIC 
from communities, they are also an important step in 
setting reasonable expectations for the timeline and 
revenue of a project. Increasing expectations of the 
benefits that will come from a mining project is an 
issue companies and governments should be very sen-
sitive to, as failure to achieve unrealistic expectations 
can create resentment towards both the government 
and the company.246 Frequently however, what happens 
are overly optimistic predictions by credit seeking 
politicians or company statements to shareholders that 
only serve to inflate public expectations.247 
Despite their importance there is considerable variance 
in whether and how consultations are conducted in 
the countries studied. The government in the Phil-
ippines, for example, holds consultations with the 
public, local government units and indigenous peo-
ple (when projects are located in or around ancestral 
land). In Burkina Faso, the government goes to local 
communities to discuss the mine and the develop-
ment plan with them. But in a number of surveyed 
countries, consultations were not done at all.248 Civil 
society organizations “Mining Contracts: How to Read 
and Understand Them,” (Creative Commons, 2013), p. 
109. “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand 
Them,” (Creative Commons, 2013), p. 109. in Azerbaijan 
report that neither the government nor the companies 
consult with them at any point in the negotiation pro-
cess. Often in past negotiations in Mozambique, local 
communities were not involved which had a negative 
effect on subsequent interactions between companies 
and local communities as well as subsequent negotia-
tions for other mining projects.249 
245 “Civil Society Representative.” Telephone interview. 17 March 
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BUILDING A NEGOTIATION TEAM
One of the most significant decisions in the negotiation 
process is determining the composition of the negoti-
ating teams.250 The structure of the government’s team 
can vary significantly, depending on the importance 
of the project, the complexity of the agreement, and/or 
the country’s governance structure. Typically govern-
ment teams are led by the ministry responsible for 
mining, an inter-ministerial commission (IMC) or the 
national mining company, if it exists.251 
An IMC generally includes high-level representatives 
of relevant ministries responsible for finance, environ-
ment, economic planning, and labor. Ideally, members 
should have experience working together and on mul-
tiple negotiations. The team in Liberia negotiating its 
major mining licenses is led by the Minerals Technical 
Committee, giving it the authority to make high-level 
decisions during negotiations. In Sierra Leone, a Min-
erals Advisory Board advises the Minister.252 Cameroon 
has a similar structure comprised of a strategic counsel 
for negotiating mining contracts that includes political 
and technical units. Ministers sit on the political unit, 
technical advisors sit on the other, and six or seven 
ministries can be represented at a negotiation.253 Some 
advisors would suggest it is best that the leader of 
the negotiating team or the IMC not be a minister or 
other political appointee, but the leader does need to 
be someone with access to, and the full support of, the 
head of government.254 
Even when not led by an IMC, the government team 
can be expected to include representatives from min-
ing-related ministries including Justice, Finance, and 
Strategic Planning. Ideally the ministries of Environ-
ment, Labor, and the National Investment Commis-
sion (where they exist) would also be included.255 Best 
practice would include a representative from every 
ministry that will be affected by the agreement in 
the negotiating team. The result can often be a large 
negotiating team which can create problems includ-
250 “International Advisor 1.” Telephone interview, 29 April 2015.
251 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” 
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255 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” (Crea-
tive Commons, 2013), p. 24.
ing confusion, internal conflict and a divided front at 
the negotiating table. For that reason, some countries 
prefer to have a larger advisory team when preparing 
for negotiations, but keep the actual negotiation team 
itself small. 
Best practices would be for the government’s nego-
tiating and/or advisory teams to meet shortly before 
meeting with the company to go over key points and 
its national negotiating position. The Cameroonian 
government uses these meetings to set its priorities 
and its non-negotiable terms, for example.256 This 
should take into account the stakeholder consultations, 
impact assessments, feasibility studies, and the differ-
ing priorities and positions of all the relevant govern-
256 ”Government Official.” Telephone interview. 17 March 2015.
INTERVIEWEES’ RECOMMENDED BEST PRACTICES 
FOR GOVERNMENTS IN NEGOTIATIONS
– Negotiating team, especially the team leader, must 
have the full support and confidence of the head of 
government 
– Team leader should not be a minister or other polit-
ical appointee. Better if led by an experienced civil 
servant
– Team should include representatives from every 
ministry the contract will involve
– Government team should have experience working 
together and should stay together to oversee imple-
mentation
– Government should be willing to invest in hiring 
expert assistance
– Government must do its homework on its mineral 
resources and the company
– Negotiations should take place in the host country 
and in a language with which the government team 
is comfortable
– Include local lawyers in the team to get experience 
and be trained by the outside advisors
– Government should draft agreement so they are 
clear what was agreed to
– Set negotiation timetable 
– Get access to the data used in the company’s feasi-
bility study
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ment ministries and agencies.257 This might involve 
30-40 people in a room discussing negotiation strategy. 
This process is important not just for achieving con-
sensus on the issues before going into the negotiating 
room and identifying areas where more information or 
assistance is necessary, but also for getting buy-in from 
the other government agencies. Having broad-based 
inter-governmental support from the outset can pre-
vent the development of opposition to the agreement 
within government.258
The company on the other side of the table is simul-
taneously putting together its team. Similarly, in-
terviewed corporate representatives highlighted the 
amount of variation in the composition and size of the 
negotiating team, depending on the company involved, 
its relationship to the government and the size of the 
project. Small projects involving junior companies 
might involve a team of only five or less, just one or 
two business development or strategy specialists in-
cluding the financial modeler, the company’s in-coun-
try representative, a lawyer, and possibly a technical 
person (geologist, infrastructure expert, etc.).259 Situa-
tions where the scope for negotiation is fairly limited, 
such as World Bank or IFC auction leading to an agree-
ment, the small team might be all that is necessary.260 
Teams for larger projects might also include engineers, 
economists, the company’s country manager, mar-
keting and finance advisors and legal teams including 
both in-house and outside counsel.261 Some companies 
will also include community relations and corporate 
social responsibility specialists.262 Depending on how 
important the company considers the project to be, 
it might also include high-level corporate represent-
atives, even the CEO. The negotiations for the license 
for the Moatize coal mine in Mozambique, for example, 
involved 20 people spread out between Mozambique 
and the company’s home office.263
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CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
It is only after all of those preparations are concluded 
that both sides commence the actual negotiation pro-
cess. The process should take place in the host country 
and both negotiations and drafts of the agreement 
should be in a language with which the government 
team is comfortable.264 The two sides will spend com-
paratively little time in actual/face-to-face contract 
negotiations. Once the process starts, frequently with 
the company responding to the government’s proposed 
draft mining agreement circulated in advance of the 
first negotiation session, days of negotiation might be 
interspersed over months while drafts are exchanged 
and reviewed, new drafts are developed, and internal 
consensus or approval sought.265 Interviewees fre-
quently cited several issues as particular points of con-
tention that have held up or dominated negotiations. 
These include: stabilization, royalties and other fiscal 
provisions and state participation.
The first and most often referenced source of con-
tention between the parties relates to stabilization 
provisions. Governments have a clear interest in 
limiting the scope of stabilization clauses. Such clauses 
can reduce a country’s ability to respond to economic 
and political developments. For companies, stabiliza-
tion clauses provide assurance against their investment 
being subject to unpredictable legal, regulatory or 
political changes that could affect the commercial via-
bility of the project, such as a change in the applicable 
level of tax on a project.266 From a company perspective 
it can also serve as protection, as the bargaining power 
shifts from companies in the early stages when gov-
ernments are anxious for investment, to the govern-
ments as a project develops and the company commits 
large amounts of capital which cannot be withdrawn 
from the country.267 It is in the interests of both parties 
to keep stabilization clauses narrowly focused on fiscal 
provisions and limited in time and scope, typically just 
long enough for the company to recoup the costs of its 
investment plus a reasonable return on that invest-
ment. Overbearing stabilization clauses can actually 
264 “International Advisor 1.” Telephone interview. 22 April 2015.
265 “Corporate Executive.” Telephone interview. 19 March 2015; 
Mining Guide
266 Negotiation Support: Glossary, available at http://negotiation-
support.org/glossary/stabilization-clause (last visited 31 March 
2015).
267 Otto, “Mining Royalties,” 2006, op. cit., p. 82.
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undermine the stability of the overall agreement and 
force renegotiation when they are too restrictive on a 
government’s ability to implement important or neces-
sary policy changes.268 
Periodic review provisions, usually time-based though 
occasionally triggered by certain specified events, are 
increasingly being seen.269 A five-year review provision 
was included in Liberia’s mining contracts. Periodic 
review can provide some flexibility. It is an acknowl-
edgement that changes occur over the course of a 
project and allows for review of the agreement in light 
of current circumstances to see if any renegotiation 
is necessary. While companies are quick to request 
renegotiation when it is in their interest, they tend 
not look favorably upon a periodic review mechanism 
that provides governments with a similar opportunity. 
Most see it as undercutting the security of the deal and 
creating the possibility of having to repeat a time- and 
resource-consuming negotiation process again just a 
few years later.270 As one company representative put 
it, “[Periodic review] makes a mockery of the two years 
they spent negotiating the original deal.”271 Corpo-
rate reception to the provision improves if the period 
between reviews is extended or is triggered by certain 
events, such as mineral prices exceed a certain range.272
The other most frequently invoked points of conten-
tion were aspects of the fiscal provisions aside from 
the stabilization issue, particularly royalties. It was 
regularly described as the area where negotiators spent 
the most time.273 Discussions typically are more com-
plex than merely setting a royalty rate, for example. 
The mineral valuation process on which royalties are 
based can be susceptible to manipulation if not well 
drafted. Governments frequently lack a clear under-
standing of the size and grade of mineral deposits, as 
well as the experience or capacity to build their own 
financial models or analyze those of the companies, 
putting them at a distinct disadvantage in this area of 
negotiations. 
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Another regularly invoked issue was state participation, 
via paid equity, carried equity or free carry.274 Project 
schedules and time frames for development were also 
mentioned. From the company perspective, govern-
ments always want a more aggressive schedule. But 
if you start with an impossible schedule you are only 
creating the basis for future problems.275 Other regular-
ly cited provisions include the details of local content, 
such as fixed percentages and schedules, local beneficia-
tion, and third party access to infrastructure.276
ISSUES AFFECTING NEGOTIATIONS
Disagreement over specific clauses is just one of the 
issues that can hinder negotiations and undermine 
efforts to reach an agreement. Respondents raised a 
number of issues many governments face that have 
negatively impacted negotiations, including: 
Capacity: According to many of those interviewed, de-
spite the economic scale of mining most countries do 
not understand the industry or the market. One lawyer 
described the lack of understanding of basic concepts 
in his conversations with government officials as 
“mind-blowing.”277 They are often inexperienced and 
lacking basic understanding of all areas of the process. 
Advice is needed on everything from the composition 
of the negotiating team to how commodity markets 
work.278 It is not unheard of for a government to have 
to rely entirely on the technical information provided 
by the company or try and repurpose existing con-
tracts no matter how ill-suited because it lacks the 
expertise to conduct its own review of the data or draft 
the appropriate contracts.279 The problem is not limited 
to developing countries; even countries with signif-
icant mining experience can fail to recognize basic 
concepts. Australia, for example introduced a mining 
super profits tax right as the most recent mineral 
boom was going bust.280 The money never came, and it 
274 “Corporate Representative.” Telephone interview. 6 March 2015; 
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contributed to the downfall of Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd.281 These problems do not just affect govern-
ments; companies have an interest in an organized 
and experienced negotiating partner. Not only does 
it decrease the cost and length of negotiations, the 
better prepared and supported the government side is, 
the better the chances of the government being a true 
partner and the agreement being implemented and 
complied with.282 
A common issue that contributes to the capacity prob-
lem in developing countries is personnel turnover in 
government.283 This can be due to financial constraints, 
political instability, or trust issues between the govern-
ment and its advisors, but it can be difficult to build a 
tenable agreement when one side of the negotiation is 
constantly changing.284 Guinea is an excellent example. 
During one negotiation the government went through 
three legal advisors, and another company represent-
ative worked with four presidents and eight ministers 
of mining in his time in the country.285 At other times, 
companies themselves can create the turnover. It is not 
unheard of for companies to hire away members of the 
government negotiating team during negotiations. Not 
only can this strengthen the company’s position in ne-
gotiations by undermining the government’s, the new-
ly hired employee brings with him inside knowledge 
of the government’s negotiation strategy. Given most 
companies’ ability to offer higher wages, this migration 
of talent from government can continue throughout 
the life of the project. This can have a discouraging ef-
fect on the government investing resources in training 
and capacity building.286 Retaining external advisors is 
one option to help address these issues, but that comes 
with another set of issues discussed in a later section.
Decision-making Authority: The discretion given to 
company representatives in negotiations varies but 
they usually go in with a mandate.287 It is not efficient 
for representatives to constantly refer back to their 
head office on when to move on to various provisions, 
so, frequently, the company’s opening position, how 
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far it is willing to go on certain terms, and its priority 
issues have been agreed to internally before negotia-
tions commence.288 
The decision making authority of the government’s 
team is not always as clear. In Afghanistan, when 
negotiators couldn’t reach consensus on certain pro-
visions, they went to the IMC to make a decision.289 In 
Liberia, the president is responsible for clearing serious 
disagreements.290 These processes can add to the dura-
tion and uncertainty of negotiations. 
For that reason, and to avoid decision paralysis that 
can come from having an insufficiently empowered 
negotiating team, some countries have their minis-
ter or an IMC lead their negotiations to ensure that 
there is decision making authority in the room. That 
solution can frequently create its own problems. A 
government official sufficiently high-ranking to have 
decision making authority can often be less informed 
on the project and sometimes unwilling to listen to the 
input of his technical advisors.291 Negotiating with an 
IMC can mean negotiating with six or seven ministers. 
It is impossible to take people on that level away from 
their other work for the length of the negotiation, so 
talks were hampered by constant distractions.292 An-
other issue with IMCs is the frequent lack of trust and 
conflicting personal interests between its members. It 
is not always easy for a politically sensitive minister 
to do what he sees as sacrificing political capital by 
making a concession in exchange for a benefit that will 
go to another ministry.293 
One negotiator saw success in Guinea using a working 
group composed solely of business and development 
representatives from the company and officials from 
the relevant government ministries, no lawyers. By 
leaving the lawyers out of the early stages they kept 
the discussion focused solely on the business issues 
not legal issues and the phrasing of terms. Only once 
the group reached an agreement in principle did they 
bring in the lawyers.294 Even then, discussions were 
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led by the principals not the lawyers.295 In fact, this 
particular negotiation did not work off written agree-
ments at all during the talks. Instead, they created 
tables aligning their positions for comparison. In this 
situation where the government speaks French and the 
company English it also facilitated quicker negotia-
tions by largely avoiding the expensive and time-con-
suming process of constantly translating new drafts of 
the contract.296
External Pressures: Another big concern around nego-
tiation is external influences. Negotiations do not take 
place in a vacuum, and due to the enormous financial 
interests and policy issues involved, the negotiating 
teams on both sides of the table are frequently operat-
ing under various pressures from the public and their 
superiors, politicians and rival companies. This creates 
myriad opportunities for corruption, political interfer-
ence, and decision paralysis.
A good, multidisciplinary government negotiating 
team, with representatives from all the relevant agen-
cies and with all the necessary technical support can 
still be completely undermined by political interfer-
ence.297 A review of the Western Garmack coal mine 
and Qara Zaghan gold mine in Afghanistan revealed 
clear signs of political interference in the tendering 
processes, issuing of contracts, and mine operations, 
all favoring inexperienced bidders.298 An official in 
Sierra Leone related an incident where the National 
Minerals Agency negotiated an agreement only for the 
President’s Chief of Staff to get involved and by the 
time the agreement reached the President for signature 
the terms had been changed. 299In another instance the 
premature end of discussions of a possible renegotia-
tion of a mining agreement was attributed to the close 
relationship between the CEO of Sierra Rutile Ltd. and 
high-ranking members of the Sierra Leonean govern-
ment.300 
295 Among experts interviewed there was a lack of consensus 
around the effectiveness of this approach.
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External pressures are not limited to politicians: 
Donors: International organizations have their 
own political agendas, ranging from promoting 
neo-liberal economic models to opposing Chinese 
investment, and can use their influence as donors 
to push those agendas. As donor country aid 
agencies are increasingly incorporated into their 
foreign ministries, their aid and advice is increas-
ingly politicized and potentially not always in the 
receiving government’s interest.301 
The Public: While negotiations should be a trans-
parent process, and the public should have some 
level of input, ultimately, the negotiation team 
should consider those views and then decide 
what is best for the country. If it is too public, it 
can paralyze negotiations. As one international 
advisor put it, “You don’t want to negotiate in an 
auditorium.”302 
Other Companies: Companies competing for 
the same project can make extravagant claims in 
an effort to win the deal, in the process creating 
unrealistic demands from government negotia-
tors.303 
Timetable: Unsurprisingly, the time it takes to con-
clude a negotiation varies wildly. They can take 
anywhere from 1-2 weeks to 18-24 months.304 Negoti-
ations that include infrastructure projects generally 
are reported to be more complicated and take longer.305 
The timeline can have serious implications and several 
corporate representatives emphasized the increased 
risk that results from prolonged negotiations. The 
longer they continue, the greater the chances that 
circumstances change and what was previously seen 
as a reasonable outcome is now perceived differently 
by at least one of the parties. This can result in re-
negotiating previously agreed to terms which erodes 
credibility and makes for an inefficient process.306 This 
can be particularly problematic when a company is 
already operating under an exploration license and has 
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to make decisions on further investment without the 
certainty of a concluded agreement for development.307
AFTER NEGOTIATION: IMPLEMENTATION 
AND MONITORING
While the contract negotiation process tends to receive 
significant attention and effort from government 
and donors, insufficient time and resources are spent 
preparing for negotiations and implementing and 
monitoring the signed agreement.308 The best drafted 
agreement, with the most advantageous terms will do 
a government little good if it is not properly imple-
mented and monitored. The government needs to map 
out the obligations and commitments in the agreement 
and relevant legislation.309 It must commit to manag-
ing its relationship and staying in regular communica-
tion with the company and local communities. There 
must be coordination between the various ministries 
and agencies responsible for ensuring that both the 
government and the company fulfill their contractual 
commitments.310 There needs to be a strong inspector-
ate that regularly visits project sites, enforces mining 
and environmental regulations and assists in conflict 
resolution.311 The government needs to conduct regular 
audits of production, export volumes, mineral valua-
tions and cost calculations.
Yet governments tend to face even more severe capac-
ity restraints when it comes to the necessary techni-
cal and monitoring capabilities necessary to oversee 
a project and ensure a company complies with its 
obligations. Institutional capacity building is a regular 
concern for companies who want efficient and relia-
ble counterparts.312 These issues can be compounded 
by the fact that all too often on the government side, 
those responsible for overseeing implementation are 
not the same as those who were in the negotiations.313 
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This can even lead to situations where the authorities 
lack knowledge of the terms and agreements they are 
responsible for implementing.314 One best practice 
suggested by interviewees is to have the same technical 
staff (not subject to political cycles) who were on the 
government team which negotiated an agreement, be 
in charge of its implementation.315 
The dangers of this lack of capacity are readily appar-
ent. In Afghanistan, under contracts reviewed for this 
study, the Khoshak Brothers Company and Afghan 
Krystal Natural Resources Company did not provide 
the government with the required documentation for 
their respective projects, including ESIAs. There are 
reports that both companies are extracting minerals 
under exploration licenses yet effective inspections of 
the projects have not occurred and they have not been 
held accountable for the little to no taxes and royalties 
being made to the government.316 In Liberia, a mining 
agreement obligated the government to establish a 
committee, to allocate the community development 
funds paid by the company between the three affected 
regions. The committee was never established and the 
funds paid by the company were never spent.317
Governments can take steps to address the issues with 
implementation, many of which they will encounter 
under a licensing regime as well as with contracts. The 
government’s capacity, or lack thereof, for oversight 
should be taken into account when developing the 
agreement. The terms chosen cannot simply be the 
best terms; they need to be the terms that will work 
best given the abilities and limitations of that country. 
This could mean choosing certain fiscal provisions that 
are easier to administer over ones that are theoretically 
more lucrative.318 “Renting” capacity is another option. 
While it can be a difficult process politically to fit in 
the budget, external assistance can be hired. Angola, 
for example, uses international auditors for the gov-
ernment audits of the country’s oil leases.319 In some 
situations, the costs of hiring external assistance, such 
as the hiring of a technical expert to monitor compli-
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ance with mine closure requirements at the company’s 
expense, can be included in the contract.320 The other 
benefit of contracting assistance is that it avoids the 
serious challenge of retaining trained staff encoun-
tered by many developing governments.321 In the 
longer-term, governments will need to devote effort 
and attention to developing implementing institutions, 
such as Sierra Leone is doing with its National Miner-
als Agency, and building their capacity. 
RENEGOTIATIONS AND ARBITRATION
It is inevitable that circumstances and conditions 
that were the basis for the original terms will change 
over the life of the agreement. Unanticipated changes 
in market conditions and commodity prices could 
fundamentally change the investment landscape and 
the fairness of the agreed-upon terms. Inexperienced 
countries that previously were overmatched in negoti-
ations or felt it necessary to offer particularly com-
pany-friendly terms to attract investors might have 
later developed a robust mining sector and now are 
seen as a desirable investment destination. Or a new 
government comes into power and initiates a review 
of agreements negotiated by the prior regime. This 
was the case in Guinea in 2010 when the new presi-
dent Alpha Conde immediately began an examination 
of deals of deceased former ruler Lansana Conte.322 
Additionally, the terms of most agreements were made 
when there was still significant uncertainty about the 
geology, duration, economics, political stability and 
other factors that could affect the commercial viability 
of the project.323 While an agreement should ensure 
security of tenure, it should not preclude the ability to 
make necessary corrections.324 
Companies often push for the inclusion of stability 
provisions in contracts, frequently the protections are 
asymmetrical, specifically allowing companies to take 
advantage of changes to the legal or regulatory regime 
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that benefit them.325 Even with that, companies reg-
ularly ask governments to renegotiate terms. In fact, 
one international lawyer related that a high-ranking 
executive at his client, a major multinational mining 
company, told him that the company knows that these 
contracts will be renegotiated over time. From its per-
spective, the key issue is establishing clear triggers and 
processes for renegotiation so that it is not a surprise 
when it does happen.326 The company would much 
rather build in an orderly safety valve than pretend 
the contract is set in stone.327 This idea is conceptual-
ly similar to the concept of periodic review, whether 
predicated on a time interval or specific triggers, dis-
cussed earlier, which suggests this company’s perspec-
tive might be an outlier. 
Additionally, companies can take steps to avoid 
renegotiations by negotiating balanced agreements. 
A mining project is a long and collaborative process, 
and prioritizing short-term wins at the negotiating 
table over building on a strong working relationship 
lays the groundwork for future situations where the 
government has no choice but to force renegotiation 
or cancellation.328 One international advisor observed 
however that some companies have the cynical view 
that it is better to negotiate imbalanced agreements 
with the expectation of later renegotiation because it 
will allow the company to appease the government by 
making concessions, but will generally still not fully 
correct the initial imbalance. 
Generally agreements can be renegotiated or cancelled 
if the original negotiation involved fraud or corrup-
tion. Last year, the Guinean government cancelled the 
deeply controversial Simandou iron ore mine operated 
by BSG Resources, alleging that the company gained 
the concession through corruption.329 Section 157 of 
the country’s (then) Mining Code allowed for a mining 
title to be revoked if a company violates the prohibi-
tion on bribery. 
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But renegotiation is as much a political issue as a legal 
one, and if after a few years, the perception is that 
the country got “a raw deal,” the government might 
demand to renegotiate.330 The government will review 
the legality of the contract and confirm whether it is 
bound by its terms. Was it just signed by the minister? 
Did he have the proper authority? Was it in conflict 
with the laws? If it was, was it enacted by parliament 
to give it force of law? If not, perhaps the government 
can claim it is invalid. A four-year review of more than 
60 contracts by the DRC government resulted in the 
renegotiation of two-thirds and the cancellation of the 
rest.331 
Usually, the company wants to maintain its opera-
tions and working relationship with the government. 
It also might be concerned about the many ways the 
government could legally impair its operations (slow 
the issuance of necessary permits, etc.), so it might be 
amenable to sitting down and discussing an alteration 
of terms. The company might be particularly willing to 
talk if it is aware it had negotiated too good a deal for 
itself.332 Nevertheless, for a government, the decision to 
cancel or force the renegotiation of a natural resources 
agreement can be a risky tactic that could have signif-
icant ramifications including financial penalties and 
damage to the country’s reputation with investors.
The corruption that caused the Guinean government 
to revoke BSG Resource’s mining title could only have 
happened because the Conte government previously 
revoked the licenses from Rio Tinto on claims that the 
company was not developing the site fast enough. This 
appeared to be a pretext so the rights could be sold to 
BSG Resources on very attractive terms for the company 
and with no upfront payments to the government. That 
ultimately prompted the bribery investigation when the 
new government came to power as well as a tangle of 
lawsuits between the companies and little to show for it 
all in terms of development of the iron ore deposit.333 
Disputes that cannot be settled amicably can also be 
submitted to arbitration. Most agreements include 
clauses providing for international arbitration. It is 
commonly used in international commercial disputes 
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and included in mining agreements, particularly when a 
company is concerned about the competence and inde-
pendence of the judicial system of its state-partner.334 
Unlike litigation, arbitration tends to be a closed pro-
ceeding and the parties and the arbitrators have much 
more discretion in how it will be conducted.335 Arbi-
tration provisions in agreements establish the law that 
will govern the dispute and the method of resolution. 
Often the agreements leave the other terms vague 
which can cause further complications in the midst of 
a dispute. The agreement usually designates one of the 
established sets of procedural rules to govern the arbi-
tration, which include the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) or the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC). It will also designate the “seat” of the arbitration, 
which determines what set of laws will supplement 
any gaps in the arbitral rules.336 
The result is that arbitration can be extremely expen-
sive and time consuming.337 It can also be highly prob-
lematic, particularly for governments. The penalties 
awarded can also be quite high and the grounds for 
appeal narrow. Large penalties against governments as 
a result of confidential procedures have been criticized 
for being in conflict with principles of good govern-
ance, transparency and accountability.338 Countries 
that negotiated regulatory terms into agreements can 
also find themselves in situations where areas are sub-
ject to arbitration that shouldn’t be, like environmen-
tal law.339 Some experts have also expressed concern 
about the potential chilling effect that can result from 
threats of arbitration; countries lacking the finances or 
capacity, afraid of potential arbitration choosing not to 
enact or improve regulations that would improve the 
environment or public welfare.340 The number of cases 
related to natural resources brought under arbitration 
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by foreign companies against countries has increased 
significantly in recent years further exacerbating the 
concern.341
In addition, companies have the added protection 
of investment treaties – where the host country has 
concluded one with the home country of the company 
– and can separately (or in addition) sue the govern-
ment in an investment arbitration. Investment treaties 
are agreements between states that establish terms, 
conditions and protections for private investment by 
companies of one state in the other state.342
THE QUESTION OF EXTERNAL 
 ASSISTANCE
It is clear many governments – especially in develop-
ing countries – face significant challenges in negoti-
ations including asymmetrical information, inferior 
resources, and inexperience with the complexities 
of many resource contracts.343 For that reason, many 
countries will bring in external advisors, experts, and 
negotiators.344 That assistance is not limited to legal 
help. Expertise is often needed in geology, estimating 
mineral potential, mineral economics, mining opera-
tion and management, and developing financial mod-
els. Even an experienced mining negotiator will not 
have all the necessary knowledge, so it is not unusual 
to have a number of advisors contributing to different 
specific areas of the negotiation. But these are highly 
technical and increasingly expensive skill sets and the 
government has to decide which help to bring in and 
how to do that.
The study found there is no one way external advisors 
are brought into the process. They can be brought 
in on the basis of personal relationships with the 
government or because they were recommended by 
other governments. Sometimes help can be brought 
in by donor institutions. Pro bono legal assistance 
might be available for developing countries from 
organizations like the International Senior Lawyers 
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Project. Frequently regional development banks, legal 
support funds or international financial institutions 
will provide governments with financial support for 
advisors.345 However, the fact that the government did 
not choose that expert can cause a disconnect between 
government and expert, potentially leading to the 
government doubting the expert’s loyalty and ignor-
ing the expert’s advice.346 Sometimes the company 
will hire experts to assist the government because the 
government’s lack of understanding or its unrealistic 
expectations are hampering negotiations. This route 
can put the advisor at risk of being perceived by the 
government as an agent of the mining company.347
The government’s concerns regarding experts hired 
by the company or other third parties are not unrea-
sonable. Conflicts of interest in this area are an oft 
overlooked but frequent occurrence, and unscrupulous 
advisors have caused harm to countries.348 Corporate 
law firms, concerned about alienating better paying 
potential corporate clients, can censor themselves or 
assign inexperienced associates.349 As discussed in the 
context of external pressures, international institu-
tions have their own agendas which may not always be 
aligned with those of the government and yet can filter 
through their selection of experts and advisors.350 Re-
ferring advisors with undisclosed interests is a subtle 
but effective way to influence an agreement.351 
Ulterior motives are not the only potential issue with 
donor assistance. According to several international 
advisors, donor-provided expertise is often not the best 
available. Donors are inexperienced in evaluating and 
hiring the appropriate experts and matching expertise 
to right project. They do not pay rates competitive for 
top of the line legal assistance and fail to appreciate 
that resource extraction is a business which requires 
that type of management.352 The opportunity costs 
required to find contracting opportunities or prepare 
bid tenders can shrink the pool of available talent.353 
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Many donors are non-profits and so have to take the 
help they are offered. But a U.S. securities lawyer doing 
some pro bono work advising the government will not 
match up well with a company lawyer who has made a 
career of this work.354 More than one expert described 
seeing agreements drafted by such external advi-
sors full of holes big enough “you could drive a truck 
through it.”355 
In addition to providing sub-optimal assistance, donor 
institutions can provide too much assistance related to 
mining law, contracts and capacity building. Interna-
tional aid organizations do not necessarily coordinate 
well and many are focused on spending their year-
ly budget, which can result in a government being 
overwhelmed by advisors with conflicting mandates, 
overlapping expertise, and different opinions. So many 
experts, missions and consultations make it even 
harder for advisors to develop relationships with the 
recipient government. Of course, the government lacks 
the capacity to manage all this advice, but since it is 
not the one paying, it does not turn it down. Afghani-
stan is a prime example of this problem.356 
For these reasons, a developing government might 
be better advised to retain its own external advisors. 
There are some donor institutions, like the African 
Legal Support Facility, that supply loans or grants to 
facilitate developing governments in hiring external 
advisors, but this would otherwise require a govern-
ment to be willing to make the financial commit-
ment necessary to secure the best possible expert 
assistance.357 This is something that many developing 
governments seem reluctant to do until an issue reach-
es international arbitration, when it may be too late. 
Greater investment in assistance during the negotia-
tion process could prevent the larger expenditures (and 
higher risk of a binding, unfavorable outcome) when a 
poor deal results in arbitration.358
Another argument for a developing government taking 
ownership of its expert assistance is the value of culti-
vating long-term relationships with its advisors. Every 
country deals with its natural resources in different 
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ways that reflect its values and experience.359 Some 
emphasize the rights of landowners to the minerals on 
their property; others maintain that minerals belong 
to the country as a whole. External advisors will need 
to be educated on legal, economic and political cir-
cumstances, and perspectives in the country that will 
influence the negotiations, as well as the government’s 
often conflicting priorities and objectives.360 This is 
quite difficult when international advisors are so often 
not retained throughout the entire process.361 The gov-
ernment further benefits from an existing relationship 
between the advisor and the rest of the negotiating 
team. There can be distrust in new relationships. The 
loyalty of the advisor to government has to be demon-
strated. The cultural disconnect must be overcome. 
These are not issues in countries where there is past 
working experience.362 In one instance in Sierra Leone, 
the World Bank awarded a contract for four mining 
concession negotiations which gave the advisor time to 
establish a working relationship with the government 
there and which reportedly worked very well.363 Unfor-
tunately, political instability and the usual turnover of 
government officials can mean that frequently within 
a few years of one project the advisor’s connection 
is severed, or new donors are unfamiliar with who 
worked on past projects and so the previous advisor is 
not invited back.364 Those interviewed suggested that 
“governments tend to have very short memories.”365 
However once external advisors are brought in and 
present, the question becomes, what is the role they 
should play in the negotiation process? Some advisors 
describe their role as simply that, to advise.366 The 
government has the prerogative to disagree.367 In fact, 
advisors should demure if the government wants them 
to tell it what to do. The government is the entity that 
needs to have ownership of the negotiation process.368 
Those interviewed who supported this position ex-
pressed concern that an international advisor active 
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at the negotiating table can lessen the government’s 
buy-in into the resulting agreement and allow it to 
later blame foreign advisors for its terms.369 In this 
conception, best practice for the advisor is to devel-
op a core of government officials and lawyers who 
understand the contract and what its impacts will be 
and assist them as they gain experience.370 The advi-
sor will do most of his or her work during negotiation 
preparations helping build consensus from the dispa-
rate views of the representatives from all the relevant 
government ministries/agencies. This approach has the 
benefit of building internal consensus which makes 
the resulting agreement more stable.371 This could also 
include the government team drafting the agreement 
(with the assistance of advisors) so it is clear what they 
are agreeing to.372 For some advisors, this approach 
extends to restricting themselves from speaking at the 
negotiating table; however, others take the view that if 
the team has prepared properly and everyone is on the 
same page, then it shouldn’t matter who speaks.373 
Other advisors advocate for a much more active role 
at the negotiating table, arguing that if advisors are 
empowered to engage with the company, they are in 
a position to play a role, if necessary, that the gov-
ernment representatives cannot. As a result of their 
outsider status, they have the ability to say things 
that government representatives might not want, or 
might not be able to say out of fear of damaging their 
relationships with the company. The external advisors 
can operate as the proverbial “bad cop,” an aggressive 
advocate putting forward the government’s positions 
and challenging the company’s, while allowing the 
government the option of supporting the advisors’ 
positions or backing down.374
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The laws governing mining and related contracts are 
different across the world. They differ in every coun-
try. In most countries, natural resources are owned 
by the state, but private companies – sometimes in 
partnership with state-owned mining companies – do 
the actual exploration and extraction of the minerals. 
The granting of mineral rights is the point of entry for 
companies into a country’s mining sector. A mineral 
right gives a company the exclusive ability to under-
take mining-related activities within a designated area 
and sets out the responsibilities and obligations that 
that right entails. 
The two primary regimes for granting and admin-
istrating mineral rights are contracts and licensing. 
Licensing regimes, based on generally applicable laws 
and with limited discretionary term-setting are the 
typical method for awarding mineral rights in coun-
tries with robust legal frameworks and strong govern-
ment institutions. In countries with young mining sec-
tors, often incomplete or inadequate legal frameworks, 
and inexperienced and capacity-limited government 
institutions, mineral rights are often granted through 
negotiated agreements. 
There is a range of different types of resource contracts 
depending on the needs of the country, its political and 
economic circumstances, its legal regime, and the min-
ing project in question, among others. Joint venture 
agreements might be used to facilitate the financing of 
an expensive mining project, or to develop economic 
linkages and promote technology transfer. Service 
agreements might be used because of the importance 
of asserting state ownership over its mineral rights. 
Relationship Between Contracts and Law
Agreements in a contract-based regime are the primary 
texts, establishing the terms of and governing mining 
projects. In licensing regimes, negotiated agreements 
can supplement or supplant existing laws. They are of-
ten used when countries are beginning to develop their 
mineral sectors and existing laws are inadequate. Nego-
tiated agreements are also sometimes seen when coun-
tries – even those with well-developed legal regimes – 
need greater flexibility for special mining projects, such 
as extremely large or remote projects.375 
375 Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining 
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 34.
Agreements supplementing the law generally contain 
substantial detail on the provisions being supplement-
ed, while otherwise referring to existing law. Provi-
sions dependent on factors specific to the project are 
the ones most often supplemented and can include 
those related to infrastructure or local communities.376 
Agreements supplanting the law do not. Those in-
terviewed suggest that fiscal terms are the ones most 
often supplanted.377 
Contract Issues
While all these types of agreements, detailing the 
terms and conditions for managing a specific project, 
can compensate for the shortcomings of the existing 
legal structures, they frequently fail to achieve optimal 
results for the country. The very benefits that make 
negotiated agreements so common for the mining 
sectors of developing countries can be the source of the 
problems that frequently result. 
One of the biggest criticisms of negotiating agreements 
is that it gives significant discretion to a small num-
ber of people, often with little to no oversight, public 
consultation, or transparency. Given the financial 
potential and economic value of mining agreements, 
discretion without proper accountability can create 
serious risks of corruption. Unlike legislation that is 
public and allows for political accountability, many 
negotiations are confidential and often the resulting 
contracts are kept confidential as well. This can extend 
so far that in some cases, other government ministries 
tasked with obligations resulting from the agreement 
were still not informed of its terms.378 
Some studies suggest it is possible that negotiated 
agreements might also undermine the long-term 
growth and stability of a country’s legal framework.379 
Negotiated agreements can depart from or even 
supplant the law. Regulatory terms that should not be 
open for negotiation may be included in the contract, 
which can result in the transfer of the government’s 
administrative and regulatory responsibilities to the 
company. In countries where weak institutions have 
376 “International Advisor 2.” Telephone interview. 22 April 2015.
377 Ibid.
378 “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,” 
 (Creative Commons, 2013).
379 Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining 
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 34.
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already created a public lack of confidence in the gov-
ernment, this can create a significant political risk. 
 
The Negotiation Process
The process of negotiating a mineral agreement can 
create additional issues for developing countries. 
Inexperience and a desperate need for investment and 
development put governments in very poor bargain-
ing positions. Asymmetrical information and a poor 
understanding of the complexities of the agreement 
undermine negotiations. Weak central government 
and public institutions hamper government coordina-
tion and management. Capacity restraints and the high 
cost of enforcement hinder effective oversight
A common problem that contributes to the issues that 
governments face in negotiations is capacity and expe-
rience. The officials tasked with negotiating a mineral 
agreement are often inexperienced and lack the basic 
understanding needed for all aspects of the process. 
Due to financial constraints, political instability, or 
trust issues between the government and its advisors, 
government negotiating teams can also experience 
significant personnel turnover. It is difficult for a 
government to advocate effectively for its interests in a 
negotiation when facing such challenges.
Another concern in the negotiation process is external 
influences. Far from taking place in a vacuum, due 
to the enormous financial, economic, and political 
implications at stake, the negotiating team is often 
operating under intense pressure from a variety of 
stakeholders. While in some cases this influence can 
be necessary and useful for the process, it can also 
paralyze decision-making and create opportunities for 
corruption and political interference.
Implementation
A successful agreement can depend as much on proper 
implementation as it does on proper drafting.380 Yet a 
government often faces even more daunting techni-
cal and capacity challenges in implementation than 
in negotiation. It must oversee the obligations and 
commitments of the agreement, conduct audits and 
inspections, coordinate between relevant govern-
ment ministries and communicate regularly with the 
380 “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 10 March 2015.
company and local communities. The individuals and 
institutions responsible for implementing agreements 
can often be different than those who negotiated the 
agreements, and in some cases due to poor govern-
ment coordination or a failure to include relevant 
institutions in the negotiations, they can be unaware 
of its terms and obligations. The difficulty of these 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement respon-
sibilities for inexperienced and capacity-restricted 
government institutions can be greatly exacerbated in 
contract regimes where they have to administer the 
varying terms, standards and definitions of individual-
ly negotiated agreements.381 
External Assistance
Many countries will bring in external advisors, ex-
perts, and negotiators to assist with the resource, expe-
rience, and information asymmetry issues they face.382 
For inexperienced governments negotiating complex 
and far reaching mining agreements against compa-
nies with extensive expertise in these areas, the need 
for this external support is often undeniable. Yet in in-
terviews for this report, a reoccurring complaint from 
many external experts who assist governments in such 
negotiations was the lack of coordination between 
donors in providing this support. Issues of conflicting 
advice, duplication of efforts, and undermined efforts 
to build relationships were all raised. Governments and 
donor institutions tend to focus most of their atten-
tion on the actual contract negotiation process while 
devoting insufficient effort and resources on both gov-
ernment preparations for negotiations and monitoring 
and implementation of the agreements once they are 
signed.
Too many different aid agencies or institutions are 
providing the same assistance and services. One expert 
complained that an institution like the World Bank 
could conduct training for government officials in a 
country on mining contract negotiation and then a 
few months later, an international NGO would conduct 
their own training on contract negotiation. Not only 
can this be an issue of resources spent on redundant 
support, it can often result in governments receiv-
ing conflicting advice. Different donors and different 
381 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 5 March 2015.
382 Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining 
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 34.
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experts provide different guidance. Their best prac-
tices and approach to the issues might conflict. While 
multiple perspectives are often beneficial, for govern-
ments with little experience in properly evaluating 
conflicting guidance to determine their own best 
practice, they can in some cases add to the capacity 
issues.383 There can be a freezing effect from too much 
assistance. 
Lack of coordination between donors can also hinder 
relationship building between governments and expert 
advisors. To maximize the benefits of expert assis-
tance to governments during contract negotiations, 
the external advisors need to be well informed on the 
nuances of the country’s legal, economic, and political 
situations, and there must be mutual trust between 
the advisor and the government’s negotiating team. 
Having existing relationships can expedite the devel-
opment of that understanding and trust. However, 
external advisors say donor institutions often initiate 
the advisors’ work providing assistance to developing 
governments. Due to poor communication, donor 
organizations hiring experts to assist a government 
are usually unaware of which experts were involved in 
past projects in that country. This adds to the existing 
challenges external advisors encounter in trying to 
build long-standing relationships with governments.  
Global Trends
The continued development of legal frameworks and 
government institutions in developing countries cou-
pled with the issues entailed by negotiating and im-
plementing contracts has led to a global trend towards 
fewer discretionary mechanisms for granting mineral 
rights. This is reflected in the licensing practices of 
developed countries in the study, such as Australia, 
Brazil, Canada and Chile which have a long history of 
mineral development and leave only narrowly circum-
scribed areas open to negotiation. 
Increasingly, developing countries – still the primary 
users of contract regimes – have begun reviews of the 
legal frameworks governing their mineral sectors. The 
results of these reform efforts are almost universally 
systems with less discretion. 
383 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 9 March 2015.
Recently, Guinea amended its Mining Code to make it 
generally applicable to all agreements, to restrict the 
government’s ability to negotiate tax provisions and 
limit agreements to supplementing not supplanting 
the Code.384 A new minerals law was also enacted in 
Afghanistan in August 2014 to improve the governance 
of the mining sector and ensure that any mining con-
tracts entered into must comply with the laws of the 
land.385 Liberia is considering a licensing system over 
its current contract regime.386 
Other countries have adopted model mining agree-
ments and are using them as the basis for their nego-
tiations. Model agreements are similar in concept to 
form contracts. Most of the document is established 
and non-negotiable; however, it includes certain well 
defined areas that are negotiable. These areas can also 
frequently only be negotiated within a pre-established 
range. Governments are finding that they strength-
en their bargaining position and reduce the capacity 
challenges they face with more experienced companies 
if the topics available for negotiation are terms like the 
royalty rate, not how royalties are calculated. In this 
study alone, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mongolia, Mozam-
bique and Sierra Leone have all either developed or are 
considering developing model mining agreements. 
In fact, the only study countries not fitting this trend 
are those that are very new to large-scale international 
mining (Afghanistan, Cameroon, Ecuador), a country 
that lacks even a distinct mining law (Azerbaijan), 
and the Philippines, which is the outlier to this global 
trend. 
Recommendations
The following recommendations are the result of the 
comparative analysis of 30 contracts from 13 coun-
tries, a review of the legal frameworks of 18 countries, 
and interviews with 37 external experts, government 
officials, company representatives, and CSOs. They are 
intended to provide some initial guidance and help fo-
384 KPMG Global Mining Institute, “Guinea: Country Mining Guide,” 
2014; “Corporate Representative.” Telephone interview. 18 March 
2015. 
385 Unofficial translation of Afghanistan’s Mineral Law dated 16 
August 2014 (Issue 1143), available at: http://mom.gov.af/Con-
tent/files/Afghanistan-%20Minerals%20Law-%20English%20
03_09_2015.pdf.
386 Alix, “The Liberian mining law reform,"2014, op. cit.
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cus further discussion on the best potential approaches 
for German development cooperation in supporting 
developing countries in granting and administering 
their mineral rights.
Recommendation: Support the development of 
strong legal frameworks for mining and supporting 
model mining agreements as an interim measure
Countries are increasingly dealing with the issues of 
discretion, corruption, and government capacity by 
limiting the scope of what is negotiable through robust 
legal frameworks and a license-based system of grant-
ing mineral rights. If done properly, this can facilitate 
a country’s sustainable development while keeping it 
attractive to foreign investment. Strong mining laws 
and a license-based system can strengthen a govern-
ment’s bargaining position, decrease the information 
asymmetries, alleviate government capacity issues, and 
decrease the risks, impacts or perception of corruption 
or outside interference. It reduces transaction costs by 
decreasing the amount of time negotiations require.387 
To achieve such successes, there is both the need and 
the opportunity to provide governments with support 
for drafting, enacting, and implementing the legisla-
tion and regulations needed for a strict license regime.
While not a replacement for a strong legal framework, 
model mining agreements can give countries a meth-
od for continuing development of its mining sector 
during the often lengthy transition to a licensing 
regime. Model mining agreements are an increasingly 
popular mechanism, but the countries most in need 
of model agreements are often the exact ones lacking 
the expertise necessary to develop them. There is the 
opportunity in those countries to support the develop-
ment of strong model agreements and to support their 
enactment into law as an interim measure, to provide 
the opportunity for parliamentary review, public 
discussion and transparency. In countries in the long-
term process of developing its legal framework, model 
agreements – even those not enacted into law – can 
provide a viable mechanism for meeting the country’s 
short-term needs.
387 Peter Rosenblum & Susan Maples, “Contracts Confidential: 
Ending Secret Deals in the Extractive Industries,” Revenue Watch 
Institute (2009).
For foreign support providers, the development of 
a model mining agreement has the added benefit of 
being a large-impact project of finite duration with a 
clear deliverable.
Recommendation: Support the negotiation of an-
cillary agreements, including those that govern the 
development of infrastructure for a mining project, 
the local content plans and community development 
agreements
Certain aspects of mining projects, such as those relat-
ed to local content requirements, infrastructure, or the 
benefits to be conferred on affected communities, are 
more specifically addressed in ancillary agreements. 
This is because such issues tend to be more project-spe-
cific than other mining provisions governing the rights 
and obligations of the parties – whether it be in a 
mining contract, or in law where a project is governed 
by a licensing regime. 
While the principle government local content obli-
gations can be addressed in generic laws, and some 
project-specific principles can be addressed in con-
tracts, the details of the implementation plan of the 
local content provisions are typically found in a local 
content plan that must be approved by a government 
representative or committee. It usually requires an 
assessment of the present and future skills available in 
the country as compared with the evolving demands 
of the company. It should propose sliding scale tar-
gets to be reached over time, enabling means such as 
training programs, review periods and enforcement 
mechanisms. While it is often seen as a company’s 
exercise, it should in fact proceed from a public-private 
partnership around the issue, stating the obligations 
of the government as well. Therefore, we consider this 
local content plan as being an agreement between the 
parties as well. Given its impact on the realization of 
local content, assistance for managing the local con-
tent process is also needed.
In turn, while some basic infrastructure requirements 
– such as the need for transport or power infrastruc-
ture, or the right to use water from a particular source, 
may be included in a mining contract or license, 
detailed requirements for the construction, financing, 
operation, and maintenance of key infrastructure is 
likely to require additional agreements. Special care in 
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negotiating such agreements will be required where 
the government wishes to promote open access of the 
mining–related infrastructure and when the infra-
structure serving the mine is operated by a third party. 
Finally, in respect of affected communities, separate 
community development agreements are increasingly 
common to set out particular company obligations. 
The requirement to consult with affected community 
representatives may be set out in the mining contract 
itself, but the details of when, how, and with which 
community representatives to do so is more likely to 
be found in a CDA. 
Such mining-related agreements should of course 
present no contradiction with the mining agreement, 
which could expressly require such agreements to be 
entered into and may even set out the principles that 
should govern those agreements. 
While most of the emphasis on contract negotiations is 
placed on the mining contract itself, the specific nature 
of each of these types of agreements requires special-
ized expertise that may be lacking in a government 
negotiating team. External assistance with the prepa-
ration for, and negotiation and implementation of such 
agreements could go a long way towards promoting 
the sustainability of mining projects.
Recommendation: Promote contract transparency
Open and transparent contracts are critical to good 
governance and the publicly accountable manage-
ment of natural resources in contract-based regimes. 
Transparency can mitigate the issues of discretion in 
contract negotiation and facilitate effective manage-
ment. An increasing number of countries now publish 
their mining agreements and contract transparency 
initiatives are seeing growing traction globally. To 
further this progress, support is needed for the devel-
opment and passage of laws on contract transparency 
in developing countries, as well for accompanying the 
process of disclosure of contracts in a way that is most 
beneficial to all stakeholders.388 While less optimal, 
support should also be given to efforts requiring the 
ratification of mining agreements which will improve 
oversight and allow for public accountability earlier in 
the contract process.
Recommendation: Better coordinate donor 
 assistance. 
Improved coordination among multilateral aid organ-
izations, donor governments, and the pool of experts 
and advisors working in this space would make negoti-
ation assistance more efficient and effective. Establish-
ment of a donor coordination framework specific to 
supporting the mineral sector in developing countries 
or another mechanism for increased communication 
between donor governments, multilateral institutions 
and international experts could address such issues. 
It would increase information sharing on past and 
future projects and facilitate complementary projects 
by donor institutions instead of conflicting ones. 
Improved coordination would make it easier to de-
velop  multi-project or multi-negotiation relationships 
between developing governments and advisors. One 
advisor interviewed noted that a coordination frame-
work could also encourage the involvement of more 
advisors and experts by lowering the opportunity costs 
of finding consultancies and project opportunities.
Recommendation: Provide support both before and 
after a contract negotiation. 
Granting a mineral right may take months or even 
years, but the terms of the right may have repercus-
sions for governments for decades. Yet too often, there 
is the perception on the part of donor institutions 
and developing governments that the granting of a 
mineral right is the final endpoint. Donor support in 
advance of a mineral right might include geological 
mapping, financial modeling, and business strategy 
388 In Guinea, CCSI and NRGI supported by the World Bank part-
nered with the government’s mining contract review committee 
to produce www.contratsminiersguinee.org, which has signifi-
cantly increased the transparency of the Guinean mining sector 
and the knowledge of Guinea’s government officials, citizens, 
and investors.
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and negotiation support.389 After the right is granted, 
while there may be donor agencies that provide some 
level of implementation support – OECD for example is 
developing Tax Inspectors Without Borders – very lit-
tle support is given to building integrated government 
oversight over the project. From a government per-
spective, mining projects involve coordinating a num-
ber of government ministries and agencies, addressing 
administrative and technical issues, and making com-
plex, sector-specific decisions.390 Such capacity building 
and support efforts can be especially useful in contract 
regimes where the implementing institutions are faced 
with terms, standards and definitions that vary due to 
individually negotiated agreements.391 
Support is needed for a government implementation 
committee that would monitor the ongoing obligations 
set out in the right, resolve technical issues, and make 
those complex, sector-specific decisions. Provisions 
for such a committee should be included in licenses 
and mining agreements, including funding provisions 
for any external advisor the government may wish to 
retain. Support efforts should begin by advocating for 
the inclusion of implementation committee provisions 
and provisions for its financing in the rights granting 
process. Support after the right was granted should 
focus on developing compliance manuals detailing all 
of the government’s obligations under the agreement, 
and on a continued engagement to identify the gov-
ernment’s technical assistance needs as they develop, 
for which assistance will be directed through the im-
plementation committee. Support could also be given 
for embedding advisors in relevant ministries such as 
mining or finance for extended periods to assist during 
the early stages of implementation, or hiring domestic 
professionals to staff the institutions even if it requires 
paying higher rates than other civil service positions.392
Recommendation: Provide nonlegal support to the 
negotiation and implementation process.
In addition to expanding support to the entirety of 
the negotiation and implementation process, support 
needs to be expanded beyond just legal and negotiation 
389 Sachs, Toledano, Mandelbaum, with Otto, “Impacts of Fiscal 
Reforms on Country Attractiveness,” 2012, op. cit., p. 374.
390 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 9 March 2015.
391 “International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 5 March 2015.
392 “International Advisor 2.” Telephone interview. 22 April 2015.
assistance. Governments are often in even greater need 
of support with mineral economics, mining opera-
tion and management, which can be entirely new to 
them. One particular need is assistance in building and 
evaluating financial models, a critical area where gov-
ernments often operate at a significant informational 
disadvantage. Governments also are frequently in need 
of access to greater geological information, such as 
their own geological surveys. 
The institutions implementing the agreements need 
support and training as well. Capacity building is 
needed for the inspectorate responsible for enforcing 
mining, safety and environmental regulations. Gov-
ernment auditors as well as economic and ore geolo-
gists monitoring revenue and production levels could 
benefit from training and assistance. 
Recommendation: Support regional legal 
 harmonization efforts.
The African Mining Vision adopted by the African Un-
ion in 2009 put forth a holistic framework for mining 
in Africa that included the need to build and integrate 
mining networks regionally. African countries have 
responded, and there have been legal harmoniza-
tion efforts around mining at the sub-regional level. 
The Economic Community of West African States is 
attempting to establish a common code of conduct for 
mining in its draft Directive on the Harmonization of 
Guiding Principles and Policies in the Mining Sector.393 
Such endeavors at regional coordination and even-
tually regional integration in mining are in the early 
stages. These efforts should be supported in develop-
ing countries worldwide. Regional cooperation could 
potentially accelerate the optimization of mineral re-
sources and expand the scope of economic linkages.394 
For countries competing with each other for foreign 
investment, regional legal harmonization would reduce 
the pressure to engage in a war of incentives. It would 
make it easier to develop cross-border mineral deposits 
393 Hany Besada and Philip Martin, “Mining Codes in Africa: 
Emergence of a “Fourth” Generation?” The North-South Institute 
(March 2013).
394 “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 19 March 2015.
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and increase markets for minerals.395 Regional har-
monization of mining-related law would also increase 
stability of and trust in the law while strengthening 
the position of those countries’ negotiators.
Recommendation: Build government capacity and 
understanding of commodity markets.
According to many of those interviewed, despite the 
economic scale of mining, most countries do not un-
derstand the mining industry or commodities markets. 
One corporate representative expressed the belief that 
a lack of understanding of the volatile nature of min-
ing’s “boom and bust” cycle contributed to the political 
downfall of the prime minister of Australia in 2013.396 
Given the impact that these commodity cycles can 
have on the success or failure of mining projects, more 
effort is needed to build government understanding of 
these complex markets. 
Support needs to be given to training programs on 
mining commodities and commodities markets for 
government decision-makers in the mining sector and 
for those involved in negotiations around mining pro-
jects. Additional more substantive support should be 
given for the education and training of mineral econ-
omists and commodities specialists in government in 
developing countries.
395 AU Conference of Ministers Responsible for Mineral Resources 
Development, “Minerals and Africa’s Development,” (December 
2011).
396 “Corporate Lawyer.” Telephone interview. 4 March 2015; Jeff 
Sparrow, “Where it all went wrong for Kevin Rudd and the Aus-
tralian Labor party,” The Guardian, 6 September 2013.
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STUDY COUNTRY SELECTION CRITERIA397
397 Note that this study limited its review to publicly available min-
ing contracts, which are more readily available since 2000 owing 
to the recent rise of transparency initiatives in the mining sector. 
The higher representation of mining contracts in recent years in 
the comparison, however, distorts the finding of a trend towards 
licensing regimes rather than negotiated contracts.
Regulatory regime section describes the current state of the coun-
tries. The other sections describe the contracts collected for the 
study - and their relationship with the Law at the date the contract 
was signed. 
 
t1  Civil law mixed with customary & Islamic law.                                 
t2  Mixed legal system of English common law, French civil law, & 
customary law.            
t3  Mixed with some customary law.                             
t4  Mixed with customary & Islamic law.            
t5  The new Minerals Law is being revised.              
t6  Liberia began examining a transition to a licensing regime in 
2012 but has an MMDA since 2008. 
t7  Still unclear if Mozambique’s new law will prohibit contract 
negotiations.             
t8  Zambia fully transitioned to a licensing regime in 2008, annulling 
all previous mining contracts.               
t9  Upper Middle Income.                  
t10  Upper Middle Income.                                       
t11  Lower Middle Income.
Country Regulatory regime                                                               Contract    TypeX Country Income Level Mining Sector Experience Era


















Income Low Income None/Limited Established 1960-70s 1980-90s 2000-2008
2009-
Present
Afghanistan  X1 X (2014 Minerals Law)5 X X X X X
Australia X X N/A N/A N/A X X
Azerbaijan X X X X  X9 X X
Brazil X X N/A N/A N/A   X10 X
Burkina Faso X
Working on a new mining 
law and has an MMDA 
(2005)
X X X X X X
Cameroon  X2 X X X X X
Canada X X N/A N/A N/A X X
Chile X X N/A N/A N/A X X
DRC Congo X Working on a new mining law X X X X X X X X
Ecuador X X X X X X
Guinea X X (New Mining Code: 2011) X X X X X X
Liberia X X (MMDA: 2008)6 X X X (pre-2008) X X X X
Mongolia X X (Draft MMDA not yet passed) X X X X X
Mozambique  X3 X (New Mining Law: 2014)7 X X X X X
Peru X X X X X X X
Philippines  X4 X X X X X X
Sierra Leone X X (Draft MMDA not yet passed) X X X X X X X
Zambia X X (Mining Law: 2008)8 N/A N/A   X11 X
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